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ENVIRONMENTAL REGULATORY POLICY: 
POLITICAL ECONOMY, INDUSTRIAL GEOGRAPHY, AND 
INTERGOVERNMENTAL FISCAL EFFECTS 
 
Environmental regulatory policy in the U.S. is a mixture of federal, state, and 
local activity and impacts. This is true of air quality regulations, which are governed at 
the federal level by the Clean Air Act. This dissertation analyzes both the political 
economy of federal environmental regulations and the empirical effects of ozone 
regulations under the Clean Air Act. 
A political economy model is developed that offers a motivation for political 
support of national environmental policy that regulates strictly local pollution. Altering 
local environmental policies in other jurisdictions will cause capital migration, which 
may increase local welfare. Thus, individuals have an incentive to influence local policies 
in other jurisdictions. National environmental policy then becomes a potential tool for 
inter-jurisdictional competition. 
The empirical impacts of ground-level ozone regulations under the Clean Air Act 
are also analyzed. The Clean Air Act established minimum air quality standards; 
localities failing to meet the established standards are classified as nonattainment areas 
and are subject to additional environmental regulations. These new regulations have a 
direct impact on polluting industries, and therefore also an indirect impact on the 
revenues and expenditures of local governments. 
First, nonattainment status is seen to alter regional industrial geography. Overall 
economic activity declines in both nonattainment areas and the surrounding jurisdictions. 
Gaining attainment status partially mitigates these impacts, although to some extent the 
 
economic impacts in both nonattainment areas and the surrounding jurisdictions do 
permanently persist. I also find evidence that manufacturing activity relocates from 
nonattainment areas to surrounding areas that face more lenient air quality regulations.  
Ozone nonattainment status is also seen to produce fiscal effects for local 
governments as changes in industrial geography alter local tax bases. Revenues and 
expenditures decline in regulated population centers, while they increase in surrounding 
areas. These increases diminish with distance from the urban center. Also, the fiscal 
impacts persist even after attainment status has been gained. 
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Chapter 1 
Introduction 
 
Environmental regulatory policy in the U.S. is a mixture of federal, state, and 
local activity and impacts. This is true of air quality policies, which are governed at the 
federal level by the Clean Air Act. The analysis in this dissertation develops a political 
economy model explaining one motivation for the existence of federal environmental 
policies that have local policy targets. It also empirically tests the regulatory impacts of 
the Clean Air Act on regional industrial geography and on local government finance. 
 
Theoretical Focus 
While local jurisdictions are free to implement local environmental regulations, 
federal regulations are often developed that focus on local polluting activity. A common 
explanation for this is that local jurisdictions lack the legal or political capability to 
regulate pollution that crosses local jurisdictional boundaries. However, this does not 
explain ground-level ozone regulation under the Clean Air Act. 
The Clean Air Act and its amendments establish national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS) for several criteria pollutants, including ground-level ozone. 
Counties failing to meet the NAAQS for a specific pollutant are classified as being in 
nonattainment for that pollutant. While nonattainment areas may include multiple 
counties, they are contained within state boundaries. Ground-level ozone pollution is 
primarily local in nature; local pollution sources are largely responsible for local ozone 
levels. Also, the Clean Air Act is not designed to primarily focus on the inter-
jurisdictional pollution that contributes to local air quality, but instead focuses on local 
pollution sources that contribute to local air quality degradations. States could implement 
their own air quality regulations or create regional authorities for this purpose in areas 
with poor air quality; states, or regional authorities that could be created by counties or 
states, contain both the polluted air and the responsible pollution sources, and so could 
regulate local or regional polluting activity. However, we instead see the implementation 
of federal air quality regulations.  
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In this dissertation I develop a model offering an explanation for why federal 
environmental policies arise when the regulated pollution is local in nature. In the model, 
environmental policy increases the cost of production in regulated jurisdictions and 
reduces the national rate of return to capital. This causes capital to migrate, which in turn 
alters local wage rates throughout the national economy. The changes in local wage rates 
and national returns to capital will harm some localities, while it may benefit others. Thus, 
a situation arises when individuals may prefer environmental policies in other 
jurisdictions that differ from the policy preference of residents of those jurisdictions. 
National environmental policy is thus a potential tool for inter-jurisdictional competition. 
 
The Clean Air Act 
Before discussing the empirical analysis in this dissertation, it is important to 
understand how the Clean Air Act regulates local air quality. Prior to the 1970 Clean Air 
Act, air quality regulation was largely the responsibility of states. By creating the Clean 
Air Act, Congress greatly increased the stringency of air quality regulation. National 
ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) were established for several criteria pollutants. 
The nation was divided into air quality regions, and regions failing to meet the NAAQS 
were classified as being in nonattainment. States were required to submit a state 
implementation plan (SIP) designed to bring nonattainment regions into attainment. 
In 1977, Congress passed the Clean Air Act Amendments. These amendments 
were in response to frustrations with the implementation of the 1970 Clean Air Act. 
States were considered to be making insufficient progress in implementing effective 
regulations and improving regional air quality. A variety of causes can be cited for this 
lack of progress, including a lack of technical expertise or resources on the part of states, 
confusion concerning how states were expected to implement the Clean Air Act 
regulations, and litigation on the part of both industrial and environmental groups. 
The 1977 Clean Air Act Amendments replaced the air quality regions with 
county-level attainment classifications. Beginning in 1978, all counties or parts of 
counties were classified as either being in or out of attainment for each criteria pollutant. 
Federal penalties were also increased. Federal funding for states was tied to state 
compliance with the Clean Air Act, and new federal civil penalties were created for 
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polluters that ignored Clean Air Act requirements. The Clean Air Act was amended again 
in 1990, making changes to a number of specific regulatory requirements such as 
abatement technology requirements and permissible automobile emissions. The 1990 
amendments did not make the same types of structural changes to implementation that 
the 1977 amendments made. 
Attainment status for each county is determined by air quality measurements. If 
an area fails to meet the NAAQS for a particular pollutant for three consecutive years, it 
is subject to being declared in nonattainment. Nonattainment status is not automatic, but 
is an administrative decision within the EPA. Once an area is declared to be in 
nonattainment, the state containing the nonattainment area is required to submit a state 
implementation plan (SIP) to the EPA. The SIP details what actions will be taken to bring 
the area into compliance with the NAAQS.  
While states are given some flexibility when developing SIPs, there are specific 
requirements each SIP must meet in order to be approved by the EPA. New facilities in 
nonattainment areas are required to use abatement technology leading to the lowest 
achievable emission rate; this requirement is not supposed to take cost into consideration. 
Existing facilities in nonattainment areas are required to use reasonably available control 
technology, which typically involves retrofitting. 
Facilities in attainment areas are also subject to regulations; these regulations are 
aimed at the prevention of significant deterioration in air quality. Large new facilities are 
required to use the best available control technology. The specific technology 
requirements are negotiated on a case by case basis, and cost is taken into consideration. 
Thus, while new facilities in attainment areas may still be subject to emissions 
regulations, nonattainment status brings stricter regulations for polluting firms. 
Once a nonattainment area has met the NAAQS, it can be reclassified as an 
attainment area. When this occurs, nonattainment regulations are no longer enforced. 
Instead, states are required to submit a maintenance plan for these areas describing what 
actions will be taken to maintain air quality compliance. The requirements for SIPs do 
not apply to maintenance plans; rather, states are given more flexibility in determining 
what regulations will be enforced to maintain attainment status. 
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Between 1978 and 2003, the years covered in this analysis, the Clean Air Act 
regulated 7 criteria pollutants: 1-hour ozone, carbon monoxide, lead, particulate matter 
smaller than 10 microns, nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and total suspended particulates. 
Not all of these pollutants were regulated for the entirety of this 26-year period, although 
the 1-hour ozone standard was enforced during this whole period. The 1-hour ozone 
standard is so named because it limits the 1-hour average concentration of ground-level 
ozone. The 1-hour standard was revoked after 2004 for almost all areas; ground-level 
ozone is now regulated by an 8-hour standard. 
While ozone is beneficial in the upper atmosphere, ground-level ozone is the main 
ingredient of smog and is harmful to both human health and vegetation. Ozone can cause 
respiratory health problems, and children and those with asthma are the most sensitive to 
ozone exposure. Ozone is not released directly into the atmosphere, but instead it is 
created by a chemical reaction between nitrous oxides (NOx) and volatile organic 
compounds (VOCs) that is caused by sunlight. Roughly half of NOx and VOC emissions 
are from automobiles; the rest come from various industrial sources such as electric 
power generation facilities. 
 
Empirical Focus 
The empirical chapters in this dissertation focus on the impacts of ground-level 
ozone nonattainment status. There is an existing literature concerning the impacts of 
ozone nonattainment on polluting industries; this literature provides the setting for the 
present research. Nonattainment regulations are designed to improve local air quality by 
targeting polluting facilities. This has been shown to significantly decrease not only 
pollution, but also economic activity in polluting industries in areas in nonattainment for 
the 1-hour ozone standard. 
While much of the existing literature focuses on industry-level impacts of ozone 
nonattainment regulations, I take a more geographically oriented approach. As polluting 
activity declines in nonattainment areas, other industries may move into the area 
replacing the lost polluting economic activity. Alternatively, inter-industry ties may cause 
overall local declines in economic activity as industries with ties to polluting firms are 
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also affected. To capture these overall impacts, I analyze the relationship between ozone 
nonattainment regulations and aggregate local economic indicators. 
Local economies do not exist in isolation. Instead, economic changes in one 
jurisdiction are expected to spill over into neighboring areas. Thus, focusing strictly on 
nonattainment areas fails to give a complete picture of the regional regulatory impacts. It 
is important to note that nonattainment regulations are only applied in nonattainment 
areas. The broader regional impacts of these regulations are caused by regional economic 
linkages, not regional application of air quality regulations. Polluting activity may 
relocate into surrounding areas where capital investments are less costly because these 
areas are not subject to nonattainment regulations. If this occurs, regulatory impact 
estimates based only on nonattainment areas will overestimate industrial impacts. It may 
also be the case that reductions in economic activity in nonattainment areas cause similar 
reductions in surrounding areas because of regional economic linkages. If this is the case, 
then analysis limited to nonattainment areas will underestimate the regional and national 
economic impacts of nonattainment regulations. 
Not only are the impacts in nonattainment areas important, but so is the 
persistence of these impacts. Nonattainment regulations are intended to improve local air 
quality; once air quality standards have been met, these regulations are replaced by a 
maintenance plan that is focused on maintaining, rather than improving, local air quality. 
While nonattainment regulations are no longer implemented in areas that have gained 
attainment, it is not expected that the economic impacts of nonattainment status are 
immediately reversed. Some persistence is expected because of the nature of the 
nonattainment regulations; firms made investment decisions during the nonattainment 
period based on the stricter nonattainment regulations, and these decisions will have 
impacts for firms beyond the point when attainment status is gained. Also, regulations 
implemented to maintain attainment status are expected to have local and regional 
economic impacts. There is not, however, an a priori expectation of the extent to which 
economic impacts will persist after attainment status has been gained. These impacts may 
be transient, largely disappearing several years after attainment status has been gained, or 
the impacts could be permanent. Analyzing the nature of regulatory impact persistence is 
important for understanding the temporal effects of ozone nonattainment regulations. 
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Finally, the industrial impacts of nonattainment regulations are expected to affect 
local governments. Cities and counties are not responsible for implementing 
nonattainment regulations, but they are not isolated from regulatory impacts; industrial 
regulatory impacts will affect the tax bases of local governments. Thus, local 
governments are not expected to experience regulatory impacts because of direct 
compliance costs, which are paid by firms that invest in new abatement technology. 
Instead, nonattainment regulations are expected to indirectly affect the revenues and 
expenditures of local governments as industrial impacts alter local tax bases. 
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Chapter 2 
A Political Economy Approach to Environmental Regulations in a  
Federated System 
 
Central governments create a variety of national policies, including policies 
designed to correct problems that are contained within single jurisdictions. When the 
policy targets are strictly local in nature, local jurisdictions may have the ability to 
address the situations with local policies. Yet central governments often still create 
national policies that regulate strictly local activity. 
For example, the Clean Air Act created national ambient air quality standards that 
apply to specific pollutants. These standards are applied at the local level, and localities 
failing to meet the standards over a three year period are declared to be non-attainment 
areas. The standards primarily focus on local air quality, not on trans-boundary pollution. 
Once an area is declared a non-attainment area, the state is required to submit a state 
implementation plan outlining what actions will be taken to achieve the ambient air 
quality standards. State implementation plans create additional regulations for industries 
that are located within non-attainment areas. 
Another example is found in a 1996 European Union Council Directive. This 
Directive creates local air quality standards regulating several air pollutants. Similar to 
the Clean Air Act, the Directive includes regulations pertaining to local air pollution. 
Such regulatory decisions could have been left to individual member states. 
In these examples, a central government has created a regulation that focuses on 
local environmental quality and not trans-boundary pollution externalities. Each 
jurisdiction where the central regulation is binding could have enacted a similar local 
regulation but chose not to do so. Why do central governments create such policies? The 
following model offers an explanation. Environmental policy causes capital to migrate in 
the model; national environmental policy then becomes a tool for inter-jurisdictional 
competition through which local capital stocks are altered, potentially producing local 
welfare benefits. Thus, jurisdictions have an incentive to influence national 
environmental policy. 
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Much of the environmental regulation literature considers competition for capital. 
For example, see Levinson (2003), Oates and Schwab (1988), Eerola (2004), and 
Fredriksson and Gaston (2000). A key question addressed both by this model and by the 
existing literature is whether outcomes are efficient when there is competition involving 
mobile capital.  
Oates and Schwab (1988) develop a model including competition for capital with 
an environmental tax, and find that the decentralized median voter outcome is efficient 
because local workers receive the full benefit of pollution abatement and bear the full 
burden of capital relocation1. They also find that heterogeneous populations within a 
jurisdiction may lead to inefficient local policies because the majority in a locality may 
externalize policy outcomes onto a minority of local residents. The model in the present 
chapter finds that the decentralized environmental policy choices of homogeneous 
jurisdictions are not first-best optimal because each jurisdiction ignores the effects of 
capital migration on all other jurisdictions. 
Markusen and Morey (1995) develop an interjurisdictional capital competition 
model that leads to decentralized outcomes that are inefficient. Levinson (1997) 
highlights that the source of the inefficiency does not directly arise from competition, but 
as the incidence of a local tax on production is exported to consumers in other 
jurisdictions. A key difference between this outcome and that of the model in the present 
chapter is that in the latter competition for local income and environmental quality, which 
are functions of local capital, directly creates an incentive to influence policies in other 
jurisdictions without considering the full welfare impacts of such policies. 
 
The Model 
This analysis models a closed economy where capital is freely mobile and labor is 
immobile. Pollution, which is produced in the production process, is strictly local in 
nature, not trans-boundary. 
                                                 
1 The model in this paper shares several key assumptions with the Oates and Schwab model. Both models 
assume capital is mobile, labor is immobile, pollution is not trans-boundary, and people work and live in 
the same jurisdiction. 
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Firms 
All firms produce a single homogeneous product that is used as numéraire. Firms 
experience constant returns to scale, and there are many perfectly competitive firms of 
indeterminate size in each jurisdiction. Production  in jurisdiction  is a function of the 
fixed local labor supply  and local capital ; . Production is concave with 
respect to labor and capital. Using subscripts to indicate partial derivatives, the marginal 
productivity of capital is given by  and the marginal productivity of labor is . 
Capital and labor exhibit diminishing marginal returns;  and . Labor and 
capital are complements, so . 
Firms emit pollution as part of the production process. This pollution is strictly 
local in nature, only affecting the local environment in the local jurisdiction. The local 
jurisdiction  sets a required environmental reclamation expenditure for firms. This 
expenditure equals a portion of total output and is given by , where ;  
corresponds with no local environmental reclamation expenditures. 
Perfectly competitive local labor and national capital markets are assumed. Both 
, the equilibrium rate of return to capital, and , the equilibrium wage rate in 
jurisdiction , are treated as exogenous by firms. Profits for firms in jurisdiction  are then 
given by 
  (1) 
Maximizing  with respect to , 
 
 
(2)
 
Similarly, maximizing  with respect to , 
 
 
(3)
 
Thus, individual firms will employ the quantity of capital and labor that results in the rate 
of return to each factor equaling a portion of its marginal productivity as determined by 
.  
Because firms experience constant returns to scale, by Euler’s theorem 
. For firms, this means that 
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 (4) 
Applying this to the profit function in (1), 
  
(5)
 
Thus, ; firms do not earn pure profits in equilibrium. 
 
Local Markets 
The local labor supply in jurisdiction  is fixed at . Also, the total demand for 
capital in jurisdiction  is . Firms within a jurisdiction use the same production 
technology, so each firm faces the same production function. Total local production in 
jurisdiction  aggregated across all local firms is then . Note that the production 
function is allowed to vary across jurisdictions. Because both  and , 
given  and the local policy , the local capital stock  and the local wage rate  are 
determined by recursively solving the following set of equations taken from the firm 
profit maximization in (2) and (3). Specifically, the first equation is solved for  in terms 
of  and , and then this result is used in the second equation to solve for  in terms of 
the same variables. 
 
 (6) 
Thus the local capital stock is  and the equilibrium local wage rate is given 
by . 
Consider the relationship between the local demand for capital and the local 
policy . Recall the firm’s profit maximization in (2). Since firms take  as exogenous, 
 
 (7) 
by the implicit function theorem. Also, 
 
 (8) 
Turning to wage impacts, note that by Euler’s theorem, , or 
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   (9) 
Thus, 
 
 (10) 
Substituting from (7) yields 
 
 (11) 
Similarly, ignoring the relationship between  and , 
 
 (12) 
and substituting from (8) yields 
 
 (13) 
 
National Economy 
There are  separate jurisdictions in the national economy. A nationally fixed 
capital stock is freely mobile between jurisdictions. The combined local demands for 
capital determine the national demand. Given a fixed national capital supply , the 
national demand for capital, , determines the national equilibrium rate of return to 
capital, . Capital is mobile and will migrate until the local rate of return to capital 
equals the national equilibrium rate of return; . The following system of 
equations simultaneously determines  and . 
 
 (14) 
Thus,  
  (15) 
While  is a local policy parameter, it affects the national capital market. Using 
the system of equations in (14), the value of  in equilibrium is derived; the proof 
is found in Proof 2.1. 
  (16) 
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Increasing the stringency of a local reclamation policy in one jurisdiction will 
increase the quantity of capital demanded in all other jurisdictions as it reduces the 
national equilibrium rate of return to capital. Formally, 
 
 (17) 
Noting that a fixed national capital stock implies that an increase in the quantity of capital 
demanded in all jurisdictions must be offset by a decrease in demand for capital in the 
regulated jurisdiction, or formally 
 
 (18) 
the following describes environmental policy impacts on local capital stocks. 
  (19) 
This observation implies that a local reclamation policy reduces local production while 
increasing production in all other jurisdictions. 
 
 (20) 
Personal income is derived from wages and from capital income. A single 
representative household supplies  labor and is endowed with  capital. Thus, wage 
income is  and capital income is . The one private good produced by firms, , 
is used as numéraire. Thus, the total income of the representative household in 
jurisdiction  is given by  
   (21) 
Note that  uniquely determines , as seen in (22). 
 
(22)
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Local Environmental Policy 
Pollutants are produced in the production process and are measured by . The 
local policy  determines the end-of-pipe abatement expenditures per unit of output; 
these expenditures reduce pollution by a factor of , where . Thus, total 
pollution is given by 
  (23) 
The impact of the local policy  on pollution is 
 (24) 
 The policy  reduces local pollution. Local environmental quality is a function of local 
pollution;  where . Thus, 
 
 (25) 
The local policy  results in improved local environmental quality. Reclamation policy 
adjustments in other jurisdictions will result in local environmental quality changes as 
capital migrates. 
   (26) 
Each jurisdiction sets its local environmental policy; . In the absence of 
a binding environmental policy . Note that  uniquely determine . 
   (27) 
The environmental policy modeled here does not directly regulate pollution 
emissions. Instead, the policy is tied to imposing a cost on total output and achieves 
improved environmental quality by increasing the cost of production and increasing 
pollution abatement expenditures. Note that from the firm’s perspective, a stricter 
environmental quality standard only increases the cost of production via  and does not 
prohibit any given level of production or associated pollution. 
 
Decentralized Policy Outcome 
Individuals value personal consumption and local environmental quality; the 
utility of residents in jurisdiction  is given by . People are assumed to live and 
work in the same jurisdiction. Also, individual preferences are assumed to be convex, 
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implying that first order conditions are sufficient for maximizing utility or a corner 
solution exists. 
When setting the local environmental policy , jurisdictions take  and  
as given and maximize local welfare. Thus, 
  (28) 
and 
 
 (29) 
Since jurisdictions are small and therefore take  as given, from an individual 
jurisdiction’s perspective 
   (30) 
this is seen by differentiating (9). The marginal impact on environmental quality is seen 
from (24) when  is taken as given; 
   (31) 
Jurisdictions will balance the tradeoff between the reduction in wage earnings and 
the improvements in environmental quality that result from the local environmental 
policy . The optimal value of  is characterized as follows. 
 
 
(32) 
The marginal cost of an increase in , incurred as income decreases, equals the marginal 
benefit of the environmental quality improvement resulting from an increase in . 
Substituting from (30) and (31), (32) becomes 
   (33) 
To understand the efficiency of this decentralized equilibrium, compare it with the 
first-best choice of , , and  by a central planner for all jurisdictions. The first-best 
resource distribution and policy choices are characterized in (34); the proof is found in 
Proof 2.2. 
   (34) 
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Since 
   (35) 
the characterization in (34) is different from the decentralized equilibrium 
characterization in (32). 
Proposition 1. The decentralized equilibrium is not first-best efficient. 
  is not maximized (36) 
 
National Policy Preferences 
I now turn to preferences regarding a national environmental policy that tightens 
the most lenient policies resulting from the decentralized equilibrium. First the case of 
symmetric jurisdictions is considered, and then the general case is analyzed. 
 
Symmetric Jurisdictions 
Consider the case of symmetric jurisdictions. When jurisdictions are symmetric, 
, , , , and . Given , . Because  
and , . Thus,  and . In the decentralized 
equilibrium, there is no capital migration. 
Now consider a national policy, , requiring that . Set  at the lowest 
decentralized equilibrium value of  and consider a marginal increase in . Because 
, tightening this national policy will alter the local reclamation policy in all 
jurisdictions. From (19), the change in demand for capital in each jurisdiction is 
   (37) 
Differentiating (9), the marginal impact of the national policy on wage income is 
seen. 
   
(38)
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While a marginal change in  does not cause capital migration, returns to capital are 
affected as demand for capital decreases in all jurisdictions. This is seen formally from 
(16). Because  and , 
  
(39)
 
Combining this with the previous observation of wage impacts, the affect on local income 
is seen by differentiating (21). 
   (40) 
Because , 
   (41) 
Turning to environmental quality, an increase in  improves the local 
environmental quality in each jurisdiction. The following is seen from (24) and (25). 
   
(42)
 
The local welfare impact of  can now be understood. Starting from the decentralized 
equilibrium characterized in (33), consider the welfare impact of a marginal increase in . 
The marginal cost of an increase in  is given in (41), and the marginal benefit is given in 
(42). Comparing (41) with (30), it is seen that . Thus, the marginal cost 
to one jurisdiction of an increase in  equals the marginal cost of an increase in  from 
its decentralized equilibrium value. 
While there is no difference in the marginal cost of a change in  and , there is a 
difference in the marginal benefit. It is seen that  from (42) and (31). 
This is because there are no capital stock adjustments when considering a national policy 
standard for symmetric jurisdictions. The marginal benefit of an increase in  is then less 
than the marginal benefit of an increase in  from its decentralized equilibrium value. 
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   (43) 
Thus, from the decentralized equilibrium policy choice characterized in (32), an increase 
in  reduces local welfare because the marginal benefit of improved environmental 
quality resulting from the policy increase is less than its marginal cost. 
   (44) 
Proposition 2. In the case of symmetric jurisdictions, no jurisdiction has an 
incentive to increase the national minimum environmental policy. Instead, welfare 
in all jurisdictions would increase if the local environmental policy was 
simultaneously decreased in all jurisdictions.  
   (45) 
In the decentralized equilibrium, each jurisdiction attempts to use local 
environmental policy to improve the local environmental quality in part by driving away 
capital. This creates a negative externality on the other jurisdictions, which receive the 
additional capital and resulting pollution. Because of this externality caused by capital 
migration, local regulations are too stringent in the decentralized equilibrium for 
symmetric jurisdictions. Even though there is no capital migration in equilibrium, the 
potential for such migration was considered by each jurisdiction when setting local 
environmental policy. A coordinated reduction of all local environmental policies would 
counter this externality, improving welfare in all jurisdictions. 
This provides a normative basis for evaluating environmental policy when 
jurisdictions are symmetric. In the absence of capital migration in the symmetric case, 
decentralized environmental policies targeting strictly local pollution are too stringent in 
all jurisdictions. This inefficiency results from the environmental externality that occurs 
when jurisdictions attempt to chase polluting capital away and into other jurisdictions; the 
cost of local environmental improvement is partially externalized onto other jurisdictions. 
 
Asymmetric Jurisdictions 
Now consider an economy where jurisdictions are not symmetric. Also, let  now 
indicate the type of jurisdiction, where there are  symmetric individual jurisdictions of 
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each type . This means, for example, that  will now indicate the income in 
any one jurisdiction that is of type . Order these types so that . 
Consider a national policy, , that will increase the national minimum 
reclamation policy from the decentralized equilibrium. A marginal increase in  will 
only have a direct regulatory impact in type 1 jurisdictions because ; the 
new national minimum value for  will only be binding in type 1 jurisdictions. Given the 
decentralized equilibrium stringency of local environmental policy in each jurisdiction, 
increasing  may increase or decrease welfare in each jurisdiction. 
Because a change in  will alter the local environmental policy in all jurisdictions 
of type 1, from (19) 
   (46) 
Because ,  for each symmetric jurisdiction of type 1. Also, 
 can be broken into two components: the change in demand for capital directly 
caused by the change in local environmental policy, and the change in local demand for 
capital caused by the change in  resulting from altering the local environmental policy 
in all type 1 jurisdictions. Thus, 
   (47) 
The national policy  will affect the local environmental policy in many 
jurisdictions, all of which are of type 1. Because of this, jurisdictions will consider the 
impact on  of an increase in . Thus, the wage impact for a change in  is seen from 
the following derivation of (9). 
  (48) 
The impact on local income is then described by the following.  
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  (49) 
Note that  when  if ; income will increase in capital importing 
jurisdictions that are not of type 1. 
The relationship between capital migration and  where  is illustrated 
in Figure 2.1. A change in  does not affect the local environmental policy in 
jurisdictions other than those of type 1, so the only impact on these jurisdictions comes 
through the impact of  on . The decrease in  caused by an increase in  will result 
in a loss of capital income shown by the blue box and a gain in wage income shown by 
the hashed trapezoid. In Figure 2.1a, the jurisdiction is a capital importer, resulting in a 
net increase in local income. The jurisdiction in Figure 2.1b is a capital exporter; this 
jurisdiction experiences a net decrease in income from a decrease in . 
The impact of an increase in  on environmental quality is derived from (23) and 
(25). 
   
(50)
 
Even though individual jurisdictions of type 1 have maximized local welfare 
through their choice of local environmental policy, one may wonder if they would 
support a national policy that increases the stringency of environmental policy in all 
jurisdictions of type 1. Such a coordinated increase across all jurisdictions of type 1 may 
have different welfare effects than an increase in only the local jurisdiction. At the 
decentralized equilibrium value of , from (30) and (49) it is seen that the marginal cost 
to jurisdiction 1 of an increase in  is greater than the marginal cost of an increase in  
if ;  when jurisdictions of type 1 are capital exporters in the 
decentralized equilibrium. Also, using (47) to compare (31) and (50), 
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Figure 2.1: Capital Migration and Income Effects of a Change in  
 (a) Capital importing jurisdiction 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
(b) Capital exporting jurisdiction 
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   (51) 
The marginal benefit of improved environmental quality in jurisdiction 1 from an 
increase in  is smaller than the marginal benefit of an increase in . Thus, at the 
decentralized equilibrium policy choice characterized in (32), the marginal cost of an 
increase in  exceeds its marginal benefit when jurisdictions of type 1 are capital 
exporters in the decentralized equilibrium. In this case, an increase in  will reduce 
welfare in jurisdiction 1. 
   (52) 
When type 1 jurisdictions are capital exporters, the decentralized choice of  is 
too high from the collective perspective of type 1 jurisdictions, and these jurisdictions 
would benefit from a coordinated reduction in environmental policy across all type 1 
jurisdictions. Such type 1 jurisdictions would not support a national policy that increased 
. As was true in the symmetric case, capital exporting type 1 jurisdictions will make 
their local environmental policy too stringent because of the externality resulting from 
capital migration; local environmental policy in one type 1 jurisdiction will cause capital 
to migrate into all other type 1 jurisdictions, thus reducing their environmental quality. 
If type 1 jurisdictions are capital importers, then both the marginal cost and 
marginal benefit from an increase in  are lower than they are in (33) and it may be true 
that . If this is the case, then the decentralized choice of  is too low. Each 
type 1 jurisdiction would then benefit from a coordinated tightening of environmental 
policy in all type 1 jurisdictions.  
Lemma 1. If type 1 jurisdictions are capital importers, they may prefer a national 
policy that strengthens environmental policy in all type 1 jurisdictions. If type 1 
jurisdictions are capital exporters, they will always oppose such a policy. 
  (53) 
Now consider the other jurisdiction types in the economy. At the decentralized 
equilibrium, jurisdiction  favors an increase in the national standard  if the 
marginal benefit of the tightening exceeds its marginal cost. Because an increase in  
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will decrease environmental quality in these jurisdictions, a tightening of the national 
policy will be supported if the welfare change from the income effect more than offsets 
the welfare lost from the environmental degradation. Otherwise, a tightening of the 
national policy would not be supported. Formally,  
   (54) 
Substituting from (49), 
   (55) 
is necessary to satisfy (54) when . Since the left hand side must be positive 
to satisfy the inequality, a necessary condition to satisfy (55) is then ; as with 
type 1 jurisdictions, capital importing jurisdictions may favor an increase in . Capital 
importing jurisdictions will favor an increase in the national standard  from the 
decentralized equilibrium value of  if the marginal benefit from the resulting increased 
income exceeds the marginal cost of the environmental degradation caused by the 
national policy change. Capital exporting jurisdictions will always favor a reduction in ; 
from (54),  for such jurisdictions. Combining these observations when  
with Lemma 1, the following is seen. 
Proposition 3. Capital importing jurisdictions may prefer a national policy that 
strengthens the most lenient local policies, while capital exporting jurisdictions 
will always oppose such a policy. 
  (56) 
In the case of asymmetric jurisdictions, a tightening of the most lenient local 
environmental policies is not Pareto improving. Instead, welfare will likely increase in 
some jurisdictions, while it will decrease in others. Given the prior decentralized 
equilibrium value of local environmental policy in each jurisdiction, jurisdictions 
benefiting from the national policy will be capital importers, while capital exporting 
jurisdictions will be harmed by the national policy. If type 1 jurisdictions would benefit 
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from an increase in , their welfare improvement would come from improved local 
environmental quality. 
It is interesting to note that for jurisdictions not of type 1, a preference for a 
national policy increasing the minimum standard for local environmental regulation does 
not arise because of environmental quality improvements; rather, such a preference may 
arise because of the capital migration and the resulting rise in local income that the 
national policy would induce in these jurisdictions. Jurisdictions not of type 1 would 
experience a decline in environmental quality, but this decline would be more than offset 
by an increase in local income in jurisdictions that favor the national policy. 
In general, when jurisdictions are asymmetric a national policy tightening the 
minimum standard for local environmental policy will have differing effects on the 
various types of jurisdictions. These differing welfare effects do not arise in the 
symmetric case because all jurisdictions experience symmetric policy impacts. When 
there are asymmetric policy impacts, individual jurisdictions may form coalitions to 
influence national environmental policy decisions. Such coalitions will attempt to 
improve welfare in some jurisdictions at the cost of other jurisdictions. 
 
Empirical Expectations 
For an empirical application, consider ground-level ozone regulations under the 
Clean Air Act. These regulations have been shown to affect firm location decisions in 
polluting industries; see Henderson (1996), Becker and Henderson (2000), and List and 
McHone (2000). The Clean Air Act influences location decisions because pollution 
abatement expenditures required by the Clean Air Act typically cost polluting facilities 
hundreds of thousands of dollars annually (Becker 2005). Thus, the Clean Air Act 
ground-level ozone regulations function similar to  and provide an empirical context for 
this model.  
One motivation for ground-level ozone regulations under the Clean Air Act is that 
by forcing some jurisdictions to tighten environmental regulations, capital will relocate to 
the benefit of certain jurisdictions. Using the Clean Air Act ground-level ozone 
regulations as an example, localities that may have an incentive to encourage more 
stringent federal environmental policy standards can be identified.  
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From Proposition 3, jurisdictions that benefit from a national environmental 
policy standard will be capital importers. Empirically, capital importing jurisdictions are 
likely those that, all else equal, are poor or are growing rapidly. Rapid growth is an 
indication that a jurisdiction is importing capital. Poor areas are expected to have a low 
capital endowment and receive most personal income through wage earnings. Areas with 
low capital endowments will likely import capital, even if they use a relatively small 
capital stock.  
Figure 2.2 uses 1980 census data to divide counties according to per capital 
income. The poorer counties identified here are likely capital importers and may benefit 
from a national ground-level ozone policy standard.  
Polluting firms that will migrate in response to nonattainment regulations are 
most likely in the manufacturing sector. Counties that are rapidly growing in response to 
the Clean Air Act are thus expected to experience rapid growth in manufacturing sector 
activity. Figure 2.3 identifies counties that grew by more than 20% in manufacturing 
sector employment between 1987 and 1992. These counties likely benefited from 
nonattainment regulations enforced in other jurisdictions. 
Figures 2.2 and 2.3 identify many counties that may benefit from a national 
ground-level ozone policy standard. Such counties would be natural allies in supporting a 
national environmental policy standard for ground-level ozone. 
 
Concluding Remarks 
In the model presented in this chapter, local environmental policies affect the 
national capital market. A local policy in one jurisdiction causes capital to relocate, 
altering wage rates and capital income in all jurisdictions. Environmental quality in all 
jurisdictions is also affected by this capital migration. There will be an incentive to 
influence environmental policies in other jurisdictions in order to improve local welfare; 
national environmental policy provides a means through which this can be accomplished. 
In general, it is expected that welfare will decline in jurisdictions that are net exporters of 
capital in response to tightening the national environmental policy standard, while 
welfare may increase in jurisdictions that are net importers of capital. 
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This result offers one explanation for why we observe central governments 
enacting environmental regulations with apparently purely local policy targets. The local 
environmental policy target has inter-jurisdictional implications; while the policy target is 
local, income and environmental effects are experienced in all jurisdictions as capital 
migrates in response to environmental policy. National environmental policy then 
becomes a tool for inter-jurisdictional competition. 
This model could be extended to further the understanding of the efficiency of 
environmental policy preferences. The environmental tax competition literature examines 
tax harmonization as a potential solution to inefficiencies from decentralized outcomes; 
for example, see Cassing and Kuhn (2003) , Cremer and Gahvari (2004), and Duval and 
Hamilton (2002). The model in this chapter could be extended to compare the efficiency 
of decentralized equilibrium outcomes with that of a harmonized national policy when 
jurisdictions are not symmetric. 
The relationship between capital migration in this model and vertical externalities 
could also be explored. As Keen and Kotsogiannis (2002) describe, local policies may 
not only horizontally affect other jurisdictions but also other levels of government. This 
could be explored by allowing the national government to tax production for the 
provision of a public good. The use of national policy for horizontal competition between 
local jurisdictions could then have interesting vertical efficiency implications. 
Finally, the present analysis restricts the environmental policy instrument to a 
uniform requirement for all firms based on production. Varying the policy instrument 
may alter its effectiveness as a tool for competition, possibly leading to more efficient 
decentralized and national policy outcomes. Future research could focus on the 
relationship between policy instrument design and horizontal competition. 
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Proof 2.1: Proof of (16) 
Let  and . Also, 
recall that  and . First, take the total derivative of , , , and . 
  (A.1) 
Next substitute  and  into  and . 
  (A.2) 
Each  is chosen taking the value of  in all other jurisdictions as given. Once the 
economy is in equilibrium and the value of  has been optimized in each jurisdiction, the 
impact in jurisdiction  of a marginal change in  can be analyzed ignoring the 
subsequent adjustment in  by the envelope theorem. Thus, in equilibrium  
can be treated as independent from  when considering the effects of a change 
in , implying that the coefficient of  must equal zero in the above equations. 
Factoring  and  and then using the coefficient for  in each equation, the 
following is seen. 
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  (A.3) 
Restating (A.3) in matrix notation, 
  (A.4) 
By Cramer’s rule,  is then calculated as follows. 
  (A.5) 
I now calculate the relevant partial derivatives. 
  (A.6) 
Thus, 
  (A.7) 
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Proof 2.2: Proof of (34) 
Let  give the social welfare function for the economy. The first-
best choice of , , and  for all jurisdictions will maximize  subject to . 
Solving 
   (B.1) 
using the Lagrangian method produces 
   (B.2) 
and the following first order conditions. 
   (B.3) 
Because ,  and . Thus, the first order 
conditions can be rewritten. 
   (B.4) 
Rearranging and dividing these equations, the following is seen. 
   (B.5) 
Given that 
   (B.6) 
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the characterization of the first-best resource distribution and policy choices can be 
derived from (B.5). 
   (B.7) 
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Chapter 3 
The Industrial Geography Impacts of the Clean Air Act 
 
The Clean Air Act and its amendments are designed to improve local air quality 
by targeting polluting sources. In localities with poor air quality, polluting industries are 
required to make additional investments in pollution abatement. Industry-level studies 
have shown that these requirements affect the output and location of polluting industries. 
To understand the overall impacts of the Clean Air Act on local economies, analysis not 
limited to polluting industries is necessary; inter-industry linkages will also result in 
regulatory impacts in nonpolluting industries.  
This chapter focuses on the impacts of the Clean Air Act on regional industrial 
geography. By considering impacts aggregated across polluting and nonpolluting 
industries, the overall local and regional impacts of the Clean Air Act can be understood. 
Recognizing that regional economies are highly interdependent, this analysis considers 
the regulatory impact both in regulated counties and the surrounding areas to capture the 
regional effects of the Clean Air Act. 
The Clean Air Act regulates a number of pollutants, and this study focuses on 
ground-level ozone regulations. While ozone is beneficial in the upper atmosphere, 
ground-level ozone presents health risks and is harmful to vegetation. Ground-level 
ozone is formed by a chemical reaction between nitrous oxides (NOx) and volatile 
organic compounds (VOC) that is caused by sunlight. Thus, ozone regulations focus on 
emissions of NOx and VOC. Roughly half of these emissions are generated by electric 
power plants and other industrial facilities; the other half of emissions are from motor 
vehicles. It is regulations imposed on these sources of pollution in areas with too much 
ground-level ozone that alter the regional industrial geography. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. After a brief overview of 
the Clean Air Act, the existing literature on the impacts of ozone regulation under the 
Clean Air Act and extensions to this literature are discussed. Then, two analyses follow; 
the first considers impacts on county wide economic indicators, and the second focuses 
on manufacturing sector impacts in both cities and counties. These analyses contribute to 
the understanding of how the regional industrial landscape by ozone regulations under the 
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Clean Air Act. The chapter concludes with a comparison of these two analyses and a 
discussion of policy implications. 
 
The Clean Air Act 
The Clean Air Act regulates several pollutants, which are known as criteria 
pollutants. National ambient air quality standards (NAAQS) determine the permissible 
levels for each criteria pollutant. If a locality fails to meet these standards over a three-
year period, it is subject to being declared a nonattainment area. This determination is not 
automatic, but is an administrative decision within the EPA. Once an area is declared to 
be in nonattainment, the state is required to develop a state implementation plan, or SIP, 
detailing what actions will be taken to meet the NAAQS. 
While states are given flexibility in developing SIPs, there are specific 
requirements a state implementation plan must meet before it is approved by the EPA. 
Technology-based pollution abatement standards are enforced in nonattainment areas that 
require existing polluting facilities to use Reasonably Available Control Technology, 
which typically involves retrofitting. New polluting facilities are required to use the 
technology necessary to attain the Lowest Achievable Emission Rate, regardless of cost. 
These requirements are more costly than those for new firms in attainment areas, which 
are typically required to use the Best Available Control Technology. These requirements 
are negotiated on a case by case basis, and cost is taken into consideration. Thus, 
polluting industries located in nonattainment areas face higher pollution abatement costs 
than do similar facilities in attainment areas. 
Nonattainment areas that satisfy the NAAQS may be reclassified as being in 
attainment. When this occurs, the regulatory requirements in the SIP for that particular 
locality no longer apply. Instead, a plan for maintaining attainment status is required. 
Regulations in this plan need not be as stringent as in the SIP because their purpose is to 
maintain, not improve, the present air quality. 
 
Current Literature and Extensions 
The current literature details many of the industrial impacts of air quality 
regulations. A number of studies have found that Clean Air Act regulations have had a 
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real impact on the location of polluting industries. Henderson (1996), Becker and 
Henderson (2000), and List and McHone (2000) find that polluting firms consider local 
air quality regulations when making location decisions. Henderson (1996) and Becker 
and Henderson (2000) observe that ozone nonattainment status reduces firm births in a 
county, and List and McHone (2000) find that ozone attainment status affects location 
decisions for relocating plants.  
Looking beyond firm locations, Becker and Henderson (2000) also find that 
nonattainment regulations affect investment and growth patterns in polluting facilities. 
Greenstone (2002) finds significant reductions in employment, capital stock, and output 
in pollution-intensive industries for nonattainment counties. Pollution abatement 
expenditures underlie all of these impacts on polluting industries. Nonattainment 
regulations typically result in hundreds of thousands of dollars in abatement costs for 
polluting industries (Becker, 2005). 
While the current literature describes many of the industrial impacts of ozone 
nonattainment under the Clean Air Act, there are still several questions that deserve more 
attention. First, it is likely that nonattainment regulations under the Clean Air Act will not 
only impact industries in nonattainment areas but also industries located in the 
surrounding areas. Regional economic linkages and industry agglomeration may cause 
the industrial impacts of nonattainment regulations to extend beyond the borders of 
nonattainment areas, producing similar impacts in surrounding areas. Alternatively, 
regional economic linkages may encourage the relocation of polluting activity from 
nonattainment areas to neighboring jurisdictions that are in attainment. For example, List 
et al (2003) observe in their dataset of firm locations in New York that a majority of firm 
relocations were to adjacent counties. As mentioned by Greenstone (2002), if this 
relocation does occur, studies that only estimate the industrial impact in nonattainment 
areas will overstate the regional and national impacts of nonattainment status. 
Second, little is known concerning the persistence of nonattainment impacts. It is 
important to understand how these impacts change with time as an area continues to be in 
nonattainment and whether these impacts persist even after attainment status has been 
gained. Concerning the first issue, regulatory impacts likely change with time in 
nonattainment areas; it is likely that industrial responses to nonattainment regulations will 
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increase as an area continues to be subject to nonattainment regulations and firms can no 
longer delay investment or relocation decisions. The extent of these changes is an 
important aspect to understanding the industrial impacts of the Clean Air Act. Turning to 
the second issue, it is important to understand the persistence of nonattainment status 
impacts after attainment status has been gained. Once an area has achieved the national 
ambient air quality standards for ground-level ozone and the area is reclassified as being 
in attainment, the nonattainment regulations are replaced with new regulations developed 
by the state aimed at maintaining attainment status. The new regulations need not cause 
the same degree of changes in polluting industries as was caused by the nonattainment 
regulations because they are focused on maintaining, not improving, the current air 
quality. The removal of nonattainment regulations will likely impact polluting industries, 
although the impacts of nonattainment regulations may also persist to some extent 
because of the nature of both the former nonattainment regulations and the regulations 
replacing them. 
Finally, the current literature focuses on impacts on polluting industries but 
largely misses the impacts of nonattainment status under the Clean Air Act on aggregate 
economic indicators. While it is important to understand the responses of industries 
directly affected by nonattainment regulations, analyzing aggregate economic indicators 
will shed light on the overall local and regional impacts of nonattainment status. 
Estimates of impacts on polluting industries will overstate the net local and regional 
impacts of nonattainment status to the degree that reductions in polluting activity are 
offset by increases in other industries as labor and capital are reallocated across industries. 
Analyzing net economic indicators provides an understanding of how nonattainment 
status affect local economies. 
 
Aggregate County Economic Impacts 
I use data from the Bureau of Labor Statistics to estimate the aggregate economic 
impacts of ozone attainment status on Ψ , the total number of establishments, total 
employment, or total wages in each county. These variables serve as indicators of general 
economic activity across industry sectors and include almost all jobs in the U.S.; this data 
is summarized in Table 3.1. 
 35
   
Table 3.1: Descriptive Statistics for Dependent Variables (BLS Data, All Industries) 
 
Untransformed
Dependent
Variable
Years 
Included in 
Data Observations Median Mean SD
Number of
Establishments 1978-2003 58567 613 2,226 7,623
Employment 1978-2003 58671 8,583 59,294 265,314
Wages 1978-2003 58567 $196,000 $1,170,000 $4,910,000
Monetary values are in $1,000s of (2000) dollars
Number of Establishment and Employment data are actual values, not 1,000s
County
Governments
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The variables Φ , , Θ φ , and θ  comprise a mutually exclusive set of dummy 
variables denoting whether a particular county is in nonattainment, has gained attainment  
status, is contiguous to a nonattainment county, or is contiguous to a county that has 
gained attainment, respectively. The assignment criteria for these categories will be 
discussed later. Y indicates the number of years a particular county, c, has been 
continuously classified in one of these categories for a particular pollutant p in year t. X 
contains a vector of control variables. 
The establishment, employment, and wage data in this analysis contains annual 
county-level observations covering 1978 through 2003; 1978 was the first year counties 
or parts of counties were identified as being in nonattainment under the Clean Air Act. In 
2003 some counties created Early Action Compacts to address ozone pollution and avoid 
nonattainment status. Because these counties were implementing ozone-related air quality 
regulations but were not in nonattainment, I exclude observations from these 99 counties 
in 2003 from the analysis. The total county wage data was deflated using the BLS 
personal consumption expenditures price index; presumably this index measures what 
cost of living wage adjustments are responding to.  
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In the above model, Φ , Θ , φ , and θ  are dummy variables indicating the 
attainment status of each given county, c. Each particular county in each year, t, will only 
be in one of these categories or in the reference group of all remaining counties. 
Nonattainment counties are identified by Φ , and counties that have gained attainment are 
identified by . If a county does not qualify for either of these groups, it then may be 
classified as being contiguous to a nonattainment county, 
37
To analyze the persistence of regulatory impacts on nonattainment counties and 
the surrounding areas, all counties in the U.S. are partitioned into five groups: those 
containing nonattainment areas, those containing areas that have gained attainment, those 
contiguous to nonattainment counties, those contiguous to counties that have gained 
attainment, and all remaining counties. Figure 3.1 maps counties according to their 
assignment to these categories in 2003. Nonattainment designations often follow county 
boundaries, and the EPA data used in this analysis is reported according to counties. In 
this analysis a county is considered to be in nonattainment if all or part of the county is 
listed in nonattainment. 
Θ
φ . Contiguous counties are 
determined by a Census Bureau dataset (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1991) that identifies 
counties as contiguous if they are physically adjacent, connected by a major road or 
bridge, or have significant commuting ties. Because the primary regulatory impact is 
expected to arise from nonattainment status and not from gaining attainment status, a 
county may be classified as being contiguous to a county that has previously gained 
attainment, θ , only if it was not classified in one of the previous groups. Table 3.2 
summarizes the sample size by attainment status category. 
 The county classifications are repeated for each criteria pollutant, p. Greenstone 
(2002) highlights the importance of this inclusion; including coefficients only for ground-
level ozone implicitly restricts the regulatory impacts of nonattainment for other criteria 
pollutants to zero. However, SIPs addressing other criteria pollutants are expected to have 
significant industrial impacts. For example, Gallop and Roberts (1983) find that sulfur 
dioxide air quality regulations reduce productivity growth for power plants. Also, many 
counties are in nonattainment for more than one criteria pollutant; ignoring the impacts of 
regulations for other criteria pollutants incorrectly attributes those impacts to the ground-
level ozone regulations for such counties. 
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Frequency % of Total Frequency % of Total
Total 58,567 3,050
Nonattainment 7,833 13% 601 20%
Gained Attainment 6,233 11% 458 15%
Contiguous to
Nonattainment 6,993 12% 790 26%
Contiguous to
Gained Attainment 7,651 13% 663 22%
All Other Observations 29,857 51% 538 18%
County 
Governments
Total Observations Unique Counties
Table 3.2: Sample Size by Attainment Status (BLS Data, All Industries) 
 
 
 
The dummy variables Φ , Θ , φ , and θ  are interacted with Y and Y 2, allowing the 
regulatory impact to vary with time1. For counties that are in nonattainment or have 
gained attainment, Y indicates the number of consecutive years the county has had that 
particular attainment status for criteria pollutant p at time t. For counties labeled as being 
contiguous to nonattainment counties or to counties that have gained attainment, Y 
indicates the greatest number of years a neighboring county has been in nonattainment or 
has maintained attainment after gaining this status. 
The vector  contains fixed effects for state and year. State fixed effects are 
included because SIP regulations are developed by states. The log of both county 
population and per capita income for each jurisdiction are included; income data is taken 
from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. To control for the industrial and 
residential mix within a county,  includes the variable “mix”, which is the ratio of 
population to employment in the county. Also, to control for urbanization, the log of the 
jurisdiction’s population density is included as a control. 
ctX
                                                 
1 Modifying the model to only include Y and not Y2 does not significantly alter estimated regulatory impacts. 
Columns (1) through (3) of Table 3.3 list the regression results for each dependent 
variable. Within each column, the joint significance for sets of variables is given. I report 
the joint significance of each set of policy variables because the regulatory effect is 
estimated using each policy variable and both interaction variables jointly; each variable 
taken on its own has little value for understanding the overall impact of nonattainment 
status. For example, relative to counties that have always been in attainment and that are  
ctX
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only contiguous to counties that have always been in attainment, after 10 years of 
nonattainment status total employment in column (2) is expected to change by 
( ) ( )[ %1010 2321 ⋅+⋅+ βββ ] , or -7.39%. The results of a significance test for 
( ) ( )[ ] −⋅+⋅+ 2321 1010 βββ  ( ) ( )[ ] 0321 =++ βββ , or ( ) 0999 32 =⋅+⋅ ββ , are reported 
in the column labeled Y=10 – Y=1. This test indicates whether there is a statistically 
significant difference between the expected change in employment between the first and 
tenth years of nonattainment. Statistical significance here indicates that the impact of 
nonattainment status does vary with time over a ten-year period as a county continues to 
have a particular attainment status. 
To understand the impact of nonattainment status, it is helpful to graph 
( ) ( )2321 YY ⋅+⋅+ βββ  against Y. Figures 3.2 through 3.5 graph this expected impact of 
nonattainment status over a ten-year period. These figures only graph the expected 
impact when this impact is statistically significant. Of the 7,833 observations of 
nonattainment counties, 3,781 observations are for counties that have been in 
nonattainment for at least 10 years. Also, 2,680 of the 6,233 observations of counties that 
have gained attainment are of counties that had maintained attainment status for at least 
ten years. Therefore, analyzing the impact of nonattainment status over a ten-year period 
is within the data.  
These graphs should be interpreted sequentially; counties are in nonattainment 
before they have the opportunity to gain attainment status. To understand the impact of 
gaining attainment status, the expected impacts shown in Figure 3.3 should be compared 
against those in Figure 3.2. If the expected impacts of nonattainment status and of gaining 
attainment status are the same, then the regulatory effects of nonattainment completely 
persist after attainment status has been gained. 
Figure 3.2 indicates that nonattainment status has a negative impact on the 
number of establishments, employment, and total wages in a county. Employment and 
total wages also decrease over time in a county as it continues to be in nonattainment. 
After ten years of nonattainment status, a 19% reduction in total county employment and 
an 11% reduction in total wages is expected. 
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Figure 3.2: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties in Nonattainment 
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Once attainment status has been gained, the number of establishments and total 
employment in a county increase relative to their expected values under nonattainment. 
This is seen in Figure 3.3. However, they are still expected to be respectively about 6% 
and 8% lower than counties that have never been in nonattainment and are only 
contiguous to counties that have always been in attainment. This indicates that gaining 
attainment only partially reverses the impacts of nonattainment status. This is likely a 
function of the nature of the nonattainment regulations and the regulations that are 
implemented to maintain attainment status. It is important for those pursuing local 
economic development to understand this partial persistence of economic impacts after 
attainment status has been gained. Gaining attainment status will enable greater local 
economic development, but it should not be expected to return the local economy to 
where it would have been had the county never been in nonattainment. 
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Figure 3.3: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties That Have Gained Attainment 
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Counties contiguous to nonattainment counties also experience negative economic 
impacts from the nonattainment regulations in neighboring counties, as shown in Figure 
3.4. It is important to note that the magnitude of the impact in contiguous counties is 
similar to that in nonattainment counties. This suggests that nonattainment status has 
economic impacts beyond the borders of nonattainment areas because of regional 
economic linkages. 
Figure 3.5 indicates that similar to counties that gain attainment, those contiguous 
to counties that gain attainment experience a partial mitigation of economic impacts. For 
example, compared with about an 11% decrease in employment and total wages after ten 
years of nonattainment in a neighboring county, employment and total wages are 
expected to be respectively 6% and 5% lower when the neighboring county gains 
attainment. The persistence of the economic impacts of ground-level ozone regulations 
geographically extends beyond nonattainment areas into the surrounding counties. 
This analysis follows the trend in the literature by considering counties to be in 
nonattainment if all or part of the county contains nonattainment areas. This assignment 
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Figure 3.4: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties Contiguous to Counties that 
are in Nonattainment 
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rule over assigns economic activity to nonattainment areas; some of the facilities in 
counties that only partially contain nonattainment areas are outside the nonattainment 
boundaries and are not subject to SIP regulations. The above findings that counties 
contiguous to nonattainment areas experience economic impacts very similar to the 
impacts in nonattainment areas suggest that this over assignment is not a problem. Instead, 
the danger lies in under assignment; because nonattainment regulations impact the 
surrounding region, the region surrounding nonattainment areas should be included in the 
analysis of regulatory impacts. Treating surrounding areas as being unaffected by 
nonattainment regulations and including those in the reference group against which 
regulatory impacts are compared will cause the regulatory impacts in nonattainment areas 
to be understated unless all of the decreases in contiguous counties are offset by increases 
in other counties. Also, ignoring the regulatory impacts in jurisdictions surrounding 
nonattainment areas will understate the regional and national regulatory impacts of 
nonattainment status. 
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Figure 3.5: Economic Impacts for All Sectors for Counties Contiguous to Counties That 
Have Gained Attainment 
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Manufacturing Industry Impacts: Cities and Counties 
The preceding analysis describes the aggregate economic impacts of 
nonattainment status on counties. Counties are often the unit of analysis in nonattainment 
regulatory studies, but they are not the only type of local jurisdiction worth studying. 
Cities are often involved in local economic development activities; analyzing the 
economic impacts of attainment status on cities is an important part of understanding the 
impacts of nonattainment status.  
As previously discussed, the current literature largely focuses on polluting 
industries. Such analysis captures industry-level impacts by analyzing the responses of 
firms directly affected by nonattainment regulations, but it is less suited for 
understanding geographically oriented impacts. Instead analysis of impacts aggregated 
across industries will better capture local impacts as skilled workers and facilities may 
transition from polluting to nonpolluting industries. Such shifts would mitigate the local 
impacts of SIP regulations. Furthermore, changes in the industrial geography of polluting 
 45
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industries can be expected to impact related nonpolluting industries in the region. 
Regional impacts measured net of changes in both polluting and nonpolluting industries 
better describe the economic effects for jurisdiction oriented analysis. 
Many polluting industries are in the manufacturing sector, and many inter-
industry linkages involving polluting industries will be within the manufacturing sector. 
To analyze the impacts of attainment status on the manufacturing sector, I use data from 
the 1987 and 1992 Economic Censuses. This data permits analysis of changes in total 
shipments in addition to changes in employment and wages. After 1992 the Economic 
Census switched from the SIC to the NAICS industry classification system, making post-
1992 data incomparable with data from before the switch. Economic Census data is 
reported by both city and county, making city-level analysis possible. 
Table 3.4 describes this data. The BLS producer price index for the manufacturing 
sector was used to deflate wage and total shipment data2. To avoid disclosure of data for 
specific firms, some observations in the Economic Census are censored; the censored 
observations are not included in the analysis. Table 3.5 summarizes the sample size by 
attainment status. The same model as was used in the previous section is used here to 
analyze the Economic Census data. Tables 3.6 and 3.7 report the results of these fixed 
effects regressions.  
 
2 Deflating wage data using the BLS personal consumption expenditures price index that was used to 
deflate total county wages in the previous section instead of the producer price index does not alter the 
estimated regulatory impacts on total manufacturing wages or production wages. 
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Similar to the impact on all economic sectors in nonattainment counties, Figure 
3.6 shows that ground-level ozone nonattainment status has a negative impact on 
manufacturing sector output and wages. As would be expected, the wage reductions in 
the manufacturing sector are greater than the wage reductions in all sectors combined in 
Figure 3.2. Gaining attainment status appears to have a positive impact on shipments 
from manufacturing industries but not on wages or employment, as seen in Figure 3.7. 
This suggests that the responses of manufacturing firms to the removal of nonattainment 
regulations are concentrated in production more than in labor. This result should be taken 
with a grain of salt, however; the coefficients for total shipments are jointly only 
marginally statistically significant. 
Figure 3.6: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties in Nonattainment 
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Figure 3.7: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties That Have Gained Attainment 
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Figure 3.8 indicates that manufacturing sector employment increases in counties 
contiguous to nonattainment counties.  As with total shipments in counties that have 
gained attainment status, these results are only marginally statistically significant. Total 
wages and total employment should experience similar changes, but wages in counties 
contiguous to nonattainment counties are not expected to be affected. Thus, further 
analysis with additional data is needed to understand the manufacturing sector impacts in 
counties contiguous to nonattainment counties. 
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Figure 3.8: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties Contiguous to Nonattainment 
Counties 
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Manufacturing sector shipments and wages benefit from gained attainment status 
in a neighboring county, as seen in Figure 3.9. As with impacts on all economic sectors, 
similar impacts are seen in counties that gain attainment and in the surrounding counties. 
This provides further evidence that regional economic linkages cause the impacts of 
nonattainment status to extend beyond the borders of nonattainment areas into the 
surrounding region. 
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Figure 3.9: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Counties Contiguous to Counties That 
Have Gained Attainment 
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When analyzing the regulatory impact on the manufacturing sector using cities as 
the geographic unit of analysis, a statistically significant regulatory impact is only 
observed for cities contiguous to nonattainment counties. As seen in Figure 3.10, in these 
cities manufacturing output, employment, and wages are expected to increase with the 
removal of nonattainment status in neighboring areas. It is interesting to note that unlike 
for counties, these are the only statistically significant impacts for the manufacturing 
sector in cities. This suggests that the manufacturing sector impacts are concentrated in 
unincorporated areas. Industry agglomeration or infrastructure and public service 
advantages in cities may be mitigating the negative impacts of nonattainment regulations. 
However, this could also be a result of insufficient data. These estimates are based on two 
years of data; city level analysis using more data may produce more descriptive estimates. 
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Figure 3.10: Manufacturing Sector Impacts for Cities Contiguous to Nonattainment 
Counties 
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Discussion and Policy Implications 
Very similar regulatory impacts are observed in both nonattainment areas and in 
surrounding areas. While nonattainment regulations are not applied beyond the borders of 
nonattainment areas, regional industry linkages extend the regulatory impacts to 
surrounding areas. It is important to understand that attainment status affects the regional 
industrial landscape. Regional impacts beyond the borders of nonattainment areas should 
be included when analyzing attainment status effects; ignoring these effects will result in 
underestimating the total regulatory impacts. 
Regional industrial impacts likely also produce regional air quality impacts. 
Ground-level ozone regulations are effective in improving local air quality in regulated 
areas (Henderson 1996); manufacturing sector activity is seen to increase in cities 
surrounding nonattainment areas. It is likely that air quality will decline in these 
surrounding areas. Increased ground-level ozone in surrounding areas is expected 
because of the manufacturing sector impacts of nonattainment status in neighboring areas. 
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The nonattainment regulation literature typically considers a county to be in 
nonattainment if all or part of the county is actually included in a nonattainment area. 
This apparent over assignment of industrial activity to regulated areas is not problematic, 
however, because the industrial regulatory impacts of nonattainment status extend 
beyond the nonattainment area. Instead, a problem of under assignment occurs. When 
calculating the national impacts of nonattainment regulations, it is important to include 
the impacts that occur beyond the boundaries of nonattainment areas. 
Analysis of aggregate economic indicators provides an understanding of the local 
and regional impacts of attainment status. These impacts are net of changes in the mix of 
local industries as an area continues in nonattainment. It is significant that even after a 
decade of changes in the local industrial composition, net regulatory impacts are not 
reduced. Total employment, total and manufacturing sector wages, the total number of 
establishments, and manufacturing shipments are all reduced by nonattainment status net 
of local adjustments in industry composition. 
Partial persistence of economic impacts is also observed after attainment status 
has been gained. Gaining attainment status reverses a portion of the nonattainment status 
impacts, but continued economic effects are observed in areas that have gained 
attainment status. This is likely caused by both the nature of the SIP regulations in 
nonattainment areas and the regulations implemented in areas that have gained attainment 
status to maintain that status. These effects provide another piece of the regulatory impact 
picture. 
These observations lead to several policy suggestions. In light of the fact that 
nonattainment status does not merely shift the local industrial composition away from 
polluting industries but lowers local net economic indicators, it is important to evaluate 
the characteristics of SIP regulations. It may be possible to improve air quality at a 
reduced local economic cost. SIP regulations are required to include technology based 
standards, which are less efficient than market based regulations. Krupnick and 
McConnell (2000) discuss efficiency gains under alternate SIP regulations for NOx, one 
of the precursors of ground-level ozone. Implementing more efficient SIP requirements 
could mitigate their local economic impacts while still achieving improved air quality. 
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While only limited flexibility currently exists for SIP regulations in nonattainment 
areas, greater regulatory flexibility is granted for Early Action Compacts. In 2003 the 
EPA offered the Early Action Compact, or EAC, as an alternative to communities that 
would otherwise likely fail to meet the new 8-hour ozone NAAQS. A successful EAC 
will achieve the required air quality improvements sooner than would be required under 
nonattainment regulations. Provided that air quality milestones are met, nonattainment 
status designation is deferred. Communities participating in Early Action Compacts have 
the opportunity to design more efficient air quality regulations, thus mitigating their 
economic impacts. 
Finally, local economic development efforts should be guided by the 
understanding that nonattainment status historically reduces local economic indicators net 
of any changes in industrial composition. Employment, wages, and production decrease 
with time as an area continues in nonattainment, indicating that any shifts in local 
industrial composition are too small to keep up with the impacts on polluting industries 
and on firms with close ties to polluting industries. Greater effort to change the local 
industrial base could reduce the net local economic costs of nonattainment. 
Local economic development in jurisdictions surrounding nonattainment areas 
should also address the impacts of nonattainment status. While nonattainment regulations 
are not applied to surrounding areas that are in attainment, the regulatory impacts extend 
to these areas. Also, gaining attainment status does not remove the need for development 
efforts to attract industries unaffected by ozone regulations. Because economic impacts 
persist after attainment status has been gained, shifts in the local industrial composition 
would be useful in mitigating these persisting economic impacts. 
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Chapter 4 
The Intergovernmental Fiscal Impacts of the Clean Air Act 
 
Regulatory policy in the U.S. is a mixture of federal, state, and local activity. This 
is the case for air quality regulation, which is governed at the federal level by the Clean 
Air Act. Localities failing to meet national air quality standards are declared to be in 
nonattainment and become subject to additional environmental regulations, which are 
implemented by the states. These regulations target polluting industries in specific 
localities in an effort to improve local air quality. Firm responses to these additional 
regulations will not only alter local patterns of industrial activity, but will also affect the 
fiscal realities of local governments.  
This chapter focuses on the fiscal impact of ground-level ozone regulation. 
Ground-level ozone, a component of smog, presents respiratory health risks and is also 
harmful to vegetation. It is formed by a chemical reaction between nitrogen oxides (NOx) 
and volatile organic compounds (VOC) that is caused by sunlight; therefore, ground-level 
ozone regulations focus on emissions of NOx and VOC. Roughly half of these emissions 
are from motor vehicles; most of the remaining emissions are from industrial and electric 
generation facilities. The focus of this analysis is to examine the impacts of ozone 
regulation on the revenues of local governments – cities and counties – in the 
metropolitan areas where these regulations are applied. In addition, recognizing that 
regional economies are highly interdependent, this analysis investigates the impacts of 
ozone regulations not only on the revenues of jurisdictions directly affected by these 
regulations, but also on neighboring localities. 
The concept of vertical fiscal externalities, now familiar in the literature of fiscal 
federalism (i.e. Keen and Kotsogiannis 2002), is at work in the fiscal impacts of federal 
air quality regulations. Vertical fiscal externalities are generally seen when one level of 
government uses the same tax base as another level of government. For example, in the 
Keen and Kotsogiannis model, local governments set taxes that result in reduced 
consumption of the taxed good. This in turn reduces the tax revenue of the national 
government. However, the reduction in national tax revenue is not taken into 
consideration by local governments when setting tax rates. This chapter considers an 
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analogous situation. Under the Clean Air Act, the federal government imposes 
regulations that affect the tax bases of local governments. These federally-originated 
regulations will therefore impact local tax revenues. The impact of federal regulatory 
policies on subnational government revenues is a matter of considerable importance for 
those governments. These impacts should also interest federal policymakers and, ideally, 
would be taken into account in the formulation of federal regulatory policies. At present, 
however, almost nothing is known about the effects of ground-level ozone regulations on 
the revenues of local governments. This chapter serves as a positive analysis of these 
effects. 
A number of studies have found that ozone regulation under the Clean Air Act 
does impact polluting industries (i.e. Henderson 1996, Becker and Henderson 2000, 
Greenstone 2002, List et al 2003, List and McHone 2000). In general, the literature finds 
that ground-level ozone nonattainment status reduces output from and the number of 
firms in polluting industries. However, this literature pays little attention to the impacts 
on localities immediately adjacent to regulated areas; the study of the impacts of air 
quality regulations on jurisdictions neighboring regulated areas is a contribution of this 
chapter aimed at understanding the regional regulatory impacts. Responses by polluting 
industries both in and surrounding regulated areas will impact the tax bases of local 
governments. 
Ground-level ozone regulations do result in improvements in local air quality (i.e. 
Henderson 1996). Clean air is an amenity, and ceteris paribus, localities with cleaner air 
are expected to be more desirable places to live. Increases in amenities via air quality 
regulations will be capitalized in property values, and this capitalization in turn impacts 
property tax revenues. Thus, while taxed industrial activity decreases in nonattainment 
areas putting downward pressure on tax revenues, the amenity of cleaner air can create 
upward pressure on revenues. The net impact on local tax revenues is a composite of 
these differing tax base influences. 
One would expect, a priori, that various types of governmental units are affected 
differently by the Clean Air Act. For example, cities and counties in the same 
nonattainment area have different tax bases that may be impacted differently by the 
additional regulations in nonattainment areas. The regulatory impact on polluting 
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industries will have a greater impact on local governments with tax bases more reliant on 
polluting industries. 
The remainder of this chapter is organized as follows. I begin with a discussion of 
the Clean Air Act and its implementation, followed with a discussion of the existing 
literature on industrial impacts of the Clean Air Act and several extensions to this 
literature. I then develop an empirical model to test the intergovernmental fiscal effects of 
the Clean Air Act and describe the data used in this analysis. I find that nonattainment 
status depresses tax revenues in urban centers but results in higher revenues in outlying 
areas. These fiscal impacts persist after attainment status has been gained, and these 
revenue changes are reflected in similar changes in current expenditures; ground-level 
nonattainment status has lasting impacts on local public service provision. I conclude by 
discussing implications for important public policy questions and directions for future 
research. 
 
Air Quality Policy and Implementation 
The Clean Air Act Amendments have created national ambient air quality 
standards (NAAQS) which apply to specific pollutants, known as criteria pollutants. 
These standards are applied at the local level, and localities failing to meet the standards 
over a three year period are declared to be nonattainment areas. Based on air quality 
measurements, attainment status is determined independently for each pollutant. A list of 
nonattainment counties is published each year in the Federal Register.  
Once an area is declared to be in nonattainment, the state is required to submit a 
state implementation plan (SIP) outlining what actions will be taken to achieve the 
ambient air quality standards. Localities are declared as nonattainment areas for specific 
pollutants; corresponding state implementation plans address the polluting sources that 
contribute the pollutants exceeding the air quality standard. 
State implementation plans create additional regulations for industries that are 
located within nonattainment areas. The EPA gives states some discretion in determining 
what will be done to improve air quality, so the specific regulatory impacts of a SIP will 
have some variation across states. This variation notwithstanding, industries will be 
affected when an area is declared to be in nonattainment. 
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Existing facilities in nonattainment areas are required to use Reasonably 
Available Control Technology, which typically involves retrofitting. New facilities in 
nonattainment areas face the stricter requirement of the Lowest Achievable Emission 
Rate, regardless of cost. To prevent large air quality deterioration in attainment areas, 
many new facilities in most attainment areas are also subject to air quality regulation; 
such facilities are required to use the Best Available Control Technology. These specific 
technology requirements are negotiated on a case by case basis, and cost is taken into 
consideration. Thus, firms located in nonattainment areas face stricter regulations than do 
firms in attainment areas. 
While the EPA sets the air quality standards, state and local governments are 
responsible for monitoring and enforcement. Federal penalties add weight to state and 
local enforcement efforts. Federal regulators also have an indirect role in monitoring and 
enforcement. The EPA must approve SIPs, and it has the authority to impose additional 
regulations if a SIP fails to bring an area into compliance with the NAAQS. Nadeau 
(1997) finds that plant-level monitoring does lead to effective enforcement of air quality 
regulations; implementation of air quality regulations does have real impacts on polluting 
firms. 
 
Existing Literature and Extensions 
A number of studies examine the industrial impacts of environmental regulations. 
One branch of this literature evaluates the location decisions of firms. Henderson (1996) 
and List and McHone (2000) find that air quality regulations affect firm location 
decisions. Firms make location decisions when opening a new facility or relocating an 
existing plant. Henderson (1996) finds that nonattainment status under the Clean Air Act 
reduces firm births in a county, and List et al (2003) find that air quality regulations 
affect location decisions for relocating plants. 
A few studies have considered impacts other than firm location decisions. 
Greenstone (2002) finds that nonattainment status reduces employment, capital stock, and 
output in pollution-intensive industries, and Gallop and Roberts (1983) find that air 
quality regulations reduce productivity growth for power plants. While environmental 
regulations appear to have a number of significant industrial impacts, there is little 
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evidence that environmental regulations have reduced the international competitiveness 
of U.S. firms. For a survey of this literature, see Jaffe et al (1995). 
While the existing literature focuses on industrial impacts of nonattainment status 
under the Clean Air Act, there are several important questions that this literature does not 
address. In particular, little attention has been paid to the effects of gaining attainment 
status, the impacts in localities contiguous to nonattainment areas, or the fiscal impacts of 
attainment status on local governments.  
Extensions for the Existing Literature 
Once an area gains attainment status, the additional environmental regulations 
that had been imposed are no longer required by the Clean Air Act. However, the effect 
of these regulations may persist after they have been removed. The purpose of the 
temporary additional regulations created by the SIP is to bring the area into sustained 
compliance with the ambient air quality standards. Thus, the impact of a successful SIP 
on local industrial activity may extend beyond the life of the SIP, either because of the 
nature of the temporary regulations, or because the SIP regulations are replaced with 
other state or local regulations to maintain compliance. However, there is no necessary 
theoretical reason to expect the regulatory effects to fully persist after attainment status 
has been gained. Even when jurisdictions maintain additional regulations to avoid future 
nonattainment status, such regulations are not subject to the same specific EPA 
requirements that govern SIPs. For example, SIPs must include technology-based 
standards; those standards could be replaced with more flexible regulations once 
attainment status has been gained, mitigating some of the SIP impacts on polluting firms. 
Also, once attainment status has been gained, regulations are focused on maintaining 
rather than improving air quality. Maintenance of current pollution levels is expected to 
be less costly than the reduction of pollution levels. 
Empirical research on the Clean Air Act has focused on regulatory effects in 
nonattainment counties. While I extend this understanding by examining the affects of 
gaining attainment status, I also consider the regulatory effects on localities that are 
contiguous to nonattainment areas. The regulatory impact on polluting industries may or 
may not be the same as in nonattainment areas. Local economic linkages and industry 
agglomeration may produce similar impacts in regions surrounding nonattainment areas, 
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( ) ( )
or polluting industries may relocate from nonattainment jurisdictions to surrounding areas 
that are still in attainment to escape the nonattainment regulations. For example, List et al 
(2003) observe in their dataset of firm locations in New York that a majority of firm 
relocations were to adjacent counties. Also, the air quality improvements in 
nonattainment areas will spill over to adjacent areas; these adjacent areas are expected to 
experience some air quality improvements unless polluting activity relocates into these 
areas. Air quality improvements would be capitalized in property values and reflected in 
property tax revenues. Thus, localities near to nonattainment areas may experience 
revenue changes that are either similar to or opposite from changes observed in the 
neighboring nonattainment areas. There is no a priori expectation for the fiscal impacts of 
nonattainment status for local governments in the surrounding attainment areas. 
 
Empirical Model and Data 
This analysis partitions all counties in the U.S. into five groups: those containing 
nonattainment areas, those containing areas that have gained attainment, those contiguous 
to nonattainment counties, those contiguous to counties that have gained attainment, and 
all remaining counties. To illustrate, Figure 4.1 gives a snapshot of these areas in 2002. 
This analysis includes data covering 1978 through 2002; 1978 was the first year specific 
counties were identified as being out of attainment for the criteria pollutants. 
To assess the affects of attainment status on local government revenues and 
expenditures I use the following model: 
( ) ( )
( ) ( ) ( )
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In this model,  is the fiscal variable of interest for local government j at time t: 
total revenue, own source revenue, total current expenditures, and property tax revenue. 
The variables Φ , , φ , and θ  comprise a mutually exclusive set of dummy variables 
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denoting whether a particular county or the county containing a particular city is in 
nonattainment, has gained attainment status, is contiguous to a nonattainment county, or 
is contiguous to a county that has gained attainment, respectively. The assignment of 
counties to these categories will be discussed later. Y indicates the number of years a 
particular county, c, has been continuously classified in one of these categories for a 
particular pollutant p in year t. X contains a vector of control variables. 
The local government fiscal data used in this analysis is available from the Census 
Bureau’s Census of Governments for 1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002. Total current 
expenditures, which excludes capital expenditures, is used instead of total expenditures 
because capital expenditures are often lumpy over time; current expenditures more 
closely reflect current public service delivery. The revenue variables were deflated using 
the Bureau of Economic Analysis price index for GDP, and government expenditures 
were deflated using the Bureau of Economic Analysis price index for state and local 
government consumption expenditures. Table 4.1 summarizes this data by government 
type.  
Table 4.1: Descriptive Statistics for Fiscal Data 
 
Untransformed Dependent 
Variable Observations Median Mean SD
Total Revenue 14,929 11,403 59,025 298,419
Total Own Source Revenue 14,929 7,265 37,174 159,977
Total Current Expenditures 14,927 10,628 55,319 283,802
Property Tax Revenue 14,907 3,062 14,724 65,442
Total Revenue 92,177 616 13,858 370,662
Total Own Source Revenue 91,749 454 10,626 249,046
Total Current Expenditures 91,868 527 12,347 348,803
Property Tax Revenue 84,251 96 2,545 61,809
County Governments
Municipal 
Governments
 
The local governments affected by these regulations include not only county 
governments, but also the other local governments found within a county, including 
municipal governments. Counties are the relevant geographic units of analysis in that 
they are the units to which regulations are often applied, but they are not the sole or nor 
necessarily the most interesting political units of analysis when assessing fiscal impacts. 
Therefore, this analysis considers the fiscal impacts on cities in addition the impacts on 
county governments. 
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In this analysis, local governments are assigned the attainment status of the 
county they are located within. The fiscal effects for governments in nonattainment 
counties and in counties that were in nonattainment but have since gained attainment 
status are estimated. Specifically, jtpΦ  is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the county 
containing local government j had nonattainment status in year t for pollutant p, and jtpΘ  
is a dummy variable equaling 1 if the county containing local government j had gained 
attainment status prior to year t for pollutant p. The reference group for governments that 
are in nonattainment counties and that are in counties that have gained attainment status 
is local governments located in counties that have never been in nonattainment and have 
never been contiguous to a nonattainment county; SIP regulations have not affected the 
counties in the reference group. 
Departing from the existing literature, Φ  and Θ  are interacted with  and , 
where  is the number of years of continuous attainment or nonattainment for the 
county containing local government j in year t for pollutant p1. One would not expect the 
fiscal effects of air quality regulations to be instantaneous or constant over time. After a 
SIP has been developed and implemented, air quality regulations are expected to have 
greater local impacts over time as existing facilities make new investments and are 
required to comply with tighter regulations. Also, facility relocation in response to SIP 
regulations is not immediate; these decisions are made over time as a county continues to 
be in nonattainment. This is why it is important to permit the fiscal impacts of attainment 
status to change over time in the model. This model specification allows a constant or 
parabolic relationship between the number of years a county has had a given attainment 
status and the impact of the status on the fiscal variable of interest. 
jtpY
2
jtpY
jtpY
Nonattainment status for each county in the U.S. was obtained from the EPA. 
Many nonattainment designations follow county boundaries, and the EPA reports 
nonattainment status according to counties. In the dataset used in this analysis a county is 
considered to be in nonattainment if all or part of the county is listed in nonattainment. 
Table 4.2 lists the number of governments used in this analysis by attainment status. 
                                                 
1 Modifying the model to only include Y and not Y2 does not significantly alter estimated regulatory fiscal 
impacts. 
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Table 4.2: Sample Size by Attainment Status (1982, 1987, 1992, 1997, and 2002 Data) 
 
Frequency % of Total
Total 14,929
Nonattainment 1,500 10%
Gained Attainment 1,574 11%
Contiguous to Nonattainment 1,496 10%
Contiguous to Gained Attainment 2,253 15%
All Other Observations 8,106 54%
Total 93,540
Nonattainment 19,338 21%
Gained Attainment 12,441 13%
Contiguous to Nonattainment 8,489 9%
Contiguous to Gained Attainment 13,532 14%
All Other Observations 39,740 42%
Total Observations
County 
Governments
Municipal 
Governments
 
 
In the model, jtpφ  indicates whether the county containing local government j was 
contiguous to a nonattainment county in year t for pollutant p, and jtpθ  indicates whether 
the county containing local government j was contiguous to a county that had gained 
attainment status prior to year t for pollutant p. This analysis uses a dataset from the 
Census Bureau (U.S. Dept. of Commerce, 1991) that defines contiguous counties to be 
those that are physically adjacent, connected by a major road or bridge, or have 
significant commuting ties. If a local government is in a county that is contiguous to a 
nonattainment county, it is considered to be contiguous to the nonattainment county. 
Like Φ  and Θ , φ  and θ  are also interacted with  and . In this analysis if 
a local government is contiguous to more than one nonattainment county, the number of 
years of continuous nonattainment status is recorded for the contiguous county that has 
been in nonattainment for the greatest number of years. Likewise, for local governments 
contiguous to multiple counties that have gained attainment status, the number of 
continuous years of attainment status is recorded for the contiguous county that has been 
in attainment for the longest time. 
jtpY
2
jtpY
A local government may be considered contiguous to a nonattainment county or 
to a county that has gained attainment status, but not both in this analysis. The primary 
regulatory effect in a region occurs because of nonattainment status; gaining attainment 
status is expected to have a smaller, secondary impact on local industry. Because 
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nonattainment status is expected to produce the primary regulatory effect in a region, if a 
local government is contiguous to a nonattainment county and to a county that has gained 
attainment status, it is recorded as simply being contiguous to a nonattainment county. 
Also, counties that are in nonattainment or that have gained attainment are not also 
recorded as being contiguous to areas in nonattainment or that have gained attainment. 
This partitions all counties into five distinct categories: those that contain nonattainment 
areas, those that have gained attainment, those that are contiguous to a nonattainment 
county, those that are contiguous to a county that has gained attainment, and all 
remaining counties. Therefore, the reference group for local governments contiguous to 
nonattainment counties and contiguous to counties that have gained attainment status is 
all local governments in counties that have never been in nonattainment and that are only 
contiguous to counties that have never been in nonattainment. 
Greenstone (2002) explains that including coefficients for each criteria pollutant 
in the model is valuable. When considering the effect of attainment status for a particular 
pollutant, the effect of attainment status for the other criteria pollutants is not restricted to 
zero when the model includes all criteria pollutants. This is important because many 
nonattainment counties are out of attainment for multiple pollutants. pβ , pγ , pη , and pχ  
are all vectors containing coefficients for each criteria pollutant regulated between 1978 
and 2002: 1 hour ozone, carbon monoxide, lead, particulate matter smaller than 10 
microns, nitrous oxide, sulfur dioxide, and total suspended particulates. 
In the model,  is a vector of control variables. These include state fixed 
effects because SIPs are developed at the state level. Fixed effects for nonattainment 
status (Φ , Θ , 
jtX
φ , and θ ) by year are included for each criteria pollutant to account for 
national industry-wide characteristics in polluting industries that change over time. Year 
fixed effects are also included. 
The revenue estimation literature highlights the importance of controlling for 
population and income (i.e. Groves and Kahn 1952, Legler and Shapiro 1968, and 
Buchanan and Weber 1982).  includes the log of population and per capita income 
estimates for counties and cities. City population data is taken from the Census of 
Governments, and annual county population estimates are from the Census Bureau 
jtX
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jtX
( )
Columns (1) through (4) in each table give the regression results for each 
dependent variable. Within each column, the joint significance for sets of variables is 
given. I report the joint significance of each set of policy variables because the fiscal 
effect is estimated using each policy variable and both interaction variables jointly; each 
variable taken on its own has little value for understanding the overall intergovernmental 
fiscal impact of the Clean Air Act. For example, relative to counties that have always 
been in attainment and that are contiguous to counties that have always been in 
attainment, total revenues for counties that have been in nonattainment for three years are 
expected to change by 
Results 
Population Division. Per capita income for each city and county is also included and is 
taken from the 1980, 1990, and 2000 decennial censuses. Because income data 
summarized by cities and counties is only available based on the decennial census, the 
Census of Governments data is matched with the temporally closest income data. 
Tables 4.3 and 4.4 list selected coefficient estimates for cities and counties. 
Because these types of governments have different tax bases and functions, it was 
important to estimate the model separately for each type of government. Using this 
approach instead of using a dummy variable for each government type allows all of the 
coefficients to vary between government types; this variation captures how the Clean Air 
Act affects each type of local government differently.  
To control for the industrial and residential mix within a county,  includes the 
variable “mix”, which is the ratio of population to employment in the county. County 
employment data is from the Bureau of Labor Statistics. Also, to control for fiscal 
characteristics, the log of the jurisdiction’s population density is included as a control; 
higher population densities are expected to reduce service delivery costs. 
 
( )2321 33 ⋅+⋅+ βββ
( )
%, or -9.53%; this is seen from column (1) 
of Table 4.4. The results of a significance test for ( )[ ] −⋅+⋅+ 2321 1010 βββ
( ) ( )[ ] 0321 =++ βββ 0999 32
 
, or ( ) =⋅+⋅ ββ , are also reported in the column labeled 
Y=10 – Y=1. This test indicates whether the expected fiscal effects after 10 years are 
statistically significantly different than the expected fiscal effects in the first year. 
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Significance indicates that the fiscal effect of that particular attainment status does 
change over a ten-year period. 
To understand how the fiscal effects change with time, it is useful to graph the 
expected fiscal impact across time. For example, to graph the impact of nonattainment 
status on total revenue, plot of ( ) ( )2321 YY ⋅+⋅+ βββ  against Y. To understand how the 
impact changes with time, the difference in the expected revenue changes between the 
first and tenth years can be calculated: ( ) ( )[ ] ( ) ( )[ ]3212321 ββββββ ++−⋅+⋅+ YY . 
Figures 4.2 through 4.9 graph the expected impact on revenues or expenditures, 
such as ( ) ( )2321 YY ⋅+⋅+ βββ , when the regulatory impact on expected revenues or 
expenditures is statistically significant; these graphs show the regulatory impact for each 
attainment status on each of the fiscal dependent variables. Each graph covers a ten-year 
period. Of the 468 counties that have contained nonattainment areas between 1978 and 
2002, 322 have been in nonattainment for a period of ten or more years. Also, 290 of the 
388 counties that have gained attainment status have subsequently maintained attainment 
for ten or more years. Thus, estimating the regulatory impact over a ten-year period is 
within the data. 
These graphs should be interpreted in sequence; local governments are in 
nonattainment before gaining attainment, so when extrapolated to a particular 
government, graphs for nonattainment areas temporally precede graphs for areas that 
have gained attainment status. This is important when considering the persistence of 
nonattainment impacts. For example, an absence of change between the graphs for 
nonattainment areas and for areas that have gained attainment would mean that the fiscal 
changes shown in the nonattainment graph persist after attainment status has been gained.  
Before discussing specific findings, some key geographic differences between the 
types of governments included this analysis should be highlighted. Counties typically do 
not follow urban boundaries; urban, suburban, and rural areas can all be found in one 
county. While regulations can benefit the entire local area via air quality improvements, 
the costs of regulations targeted at polluting industries are concentrated in more 
industrialized areas. Analysis at the county level will aggregate the regulatory fiscal 
impact across all areas in a county, both urban and rural. Cities, however, are 
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incorporated in population centers. Because outlying areas surrounding cities are often 
not incorporated, analysis at the city level will capture the regulatory fiscal impacts in 
more urban areas. The qualitative fiscal impacts in rural areas can then be understood by 
“subtracting” the impacts in cities from the impacts in counties. Because cities and 
counties rely on different mixes of taxes, this comparison is most meaningful for a 
specific type of tax, such as the property tax. Nonattainment status is expected to impact 
the tax bases for various taxes differently; thus, it will affect the total revenues of each 
type of local government differently. For example, counties rely more heavily on 
property taxes than do cities; in the data used in this analysis, on average property taxes 
comprise 31% of total county revenues and 19% of total city revenues.  
As indicated in Figure 4.2, nonattainment status results in reduced total and own 
source revenues for city governments located in counties containing nonattainment areas. 
After 10 years of nonattainment, total revenues have fallen by 18%. SIP regulations on  
Figure 4.2: Fiscal Effects for Cities in Nonattainment Counties 
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polluting activity appear to reduce the positive impact of this polluting activity on tax 
revenues. 
For cities, the fiscal effects of nonattainment status persist after attainment status 
has been gained. This is seen in Figure 4.3. Instead of returning to their pre-
nonattainment levels, revenues and expenditures continue to be lower. This indicates that 
gaining attainment status in urban or suburban areas is associated with continued 
downward fiscal impacts.  
In contrast to cities, Figure 4.4 shows that tax revenue increases for counties 
while in nonattainment. This suggests that while tax revenue collection is reduced in 
urbanized areas, more money is collected in outlying areas; counties in nonattainment 
then gain more tax revenue from outlying areas than they lose in tax revenues from 
incorporated areas. On net, unincorporated outlying areas appear to benefit from 
nonattainment status as evidenced by this apparent increase in tax revenue collection. 
Figure 4.3: Fiscal Effects for Cities in Counties That Have Gained Attainment 
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Figure 4.4: Fiscal Effects for Counties in Nonattainment 
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Figure 4.4 shows a statistically significant and large increase in total revenues 
across time; during ten years of nonattainment, total county revenues are expected to 
increase 24%. At the beginning of this period, total revenues were 15% lower than 
revenues in the reference group; the increase in revenues during the nonattainment period 
more than makes up for this. Areas surrounding urban population centers appear to 
significantly benefit fiscally from nonattainment status. These increases could reflect 
economic development as polluting industries relocate to outlying areas that have cleaner 
air. The property tax revenue increases could also reflect the capitalization of air quality 
improvements into land values. Outlying areas are typically residential and agricultural 
where clean air is an amenity; air quality improvements make these areas more desirable.  
Figure 4.5 illustrates that after rising during nonattainment, revenues and 
expenditures remain at higher levels once attainment status has been gained; the increases 
observed during nonattainment persist after attainment status has been gained. A decade 
after attainment status has been gained total revenues and current expenditures are still 
experiencing positive impacts from the local air quality regulations. It is interesting to  
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Figure 4.5: Fiscal Effects for Counties That Have Gained Attainment 
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note that the expected fiscal changes over the first decade of attainment status are smaller 
in magnitude than the changes experienced during the nonattainment period. For example, 
while total revenues are expected to increase 24% over ten years of nonattainment, they 
are not expected to experience statistically significant changes during the ten years 
following the gaining of attainment status. This indicates that regulations employed to 
maintain attainment status have a smaller fiscal impact at the county level than do the 
regulations required by the EPA to bring an area into compliance with the ground-level 
ozone NAAQS. This is likely because regulations in attainment areas are less stringent 
than those in nonattainment areas; once attainment status has been gained, the current air 
quality only needs to be maintained instead of improved. 
Turning attention to jurisdictions contiguous to nonattainment areas, I find 
statistically significant impacts on city and county government finances. Figures 4.6 and 
4.7 show a large increase in property tax revenues for jurisdictions near nonattainment 
areas. This increase indicates that outlying areas are more desirable; this could occur as  
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Figure 4.6: Fiscal Effects for Cities Contiguous to Nonattainment Counties 
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polluting industries relocate to nearby areas that do not face nonattainment regulations or 
as individuals prefer to live in surrounding areas with cleaner air. 
The fiscal impacts for counties contiguous to nonattainment areas as shown in 
Figure 4.7 are qualitatively similar to those in Figure 4.4 for nonattainment counties. 
However, it is interesting to note that the impacts on total revenues, own source revenues, 
and current expenditures are much smaller in magnitude in Figure 4.7. As discussed 
above, the increases observed in Figure 4.4 for nonattainment counties are driven by 
revenues collected in unincorporated areas. The smaller effects in Figure 4.7 for counties 
contiguous to nonattainment areas suggest that the fiscal impacts of nonattainment 
regulations diminish with distance from the urban core. 
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Figure 4.7: Fiscal Effects for Counties Contiguous to Nonattainment Counties 
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Figure 4.8 also tells a similar story, but for cities contiguous to counties that have 
gained attainment. The negative impacts for total revenue, own source revenue, and 
current expenditures are much smaller in magnitude when compared to Figure 4.3 
showing the fiscal effects for cities located in counties that have gained attainment. The 
fiscal effects of gaining attainment status appear to diminish with distance from regulated 
areas. Also, outlying cities do not fare as well as unincorporated areas. Figure 4.5 shows 
positive impacts for counties that have gained attainment status; again, qualitatively 
subtracting the negative effects for cities in Figure 4.3 indicates that the positive impacts 
for counties are driven by impacts in unincorporated areas. Outlying cities likely see 
negative, albeit small, fiscal impacts from the removal of nonattainment status in nearby 
counties because they no longer have as large of a regulatory environment advantage 
over the formerly regulated central cities. 
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Figure 4.8: Fiscal Effects for Cities Contiguous to Counties that have Gained Attainment 
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The loss of regulatory advantage also affects county property tax revenues. These 
revenues fall when a neighboring county gains attainment, as seen in Figure 4.9. This 
reduction is largely temporary, however. Compared with county property tax revenues 
after ten years of nonattainment in a contiguous county, these revenues are expected to be 
18% lower when the contiguous county gains attainment; after ten years of attainment in 
the neighboring county, property tax revenues are only 9% lower than during 
nonattainment in the contiguous county. This indicates that while the removal of 
nonattainment status appears to hurt economic development in surrounding counties, this 
particular negative impact is temporary. 
Finally, this analysis indicates that local governments do not use debt financing or 
changes in expenditures on capital projects to smooth expenditure changes associated 
with revenue shifts resulting from ground-level ozone regulations. Instead, total revenues 
and current expenditures tend to rise and fall together. This is not surprising, as this 
relationship between revenues and expenditures is observed for general revenue shocks 
by Buettner and Wildasin (2006). Consistent with expenditure responses to other revenue 
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Figure 4.9: Fiscal Effects for Counties Contiguous to Counties That Have Gained 
Attainment 
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shocks, revenue changes associated with ground-level ozone regulations result in similar 
changes in current expenditures. Thus, nonattainment status has a real impact on public 
service delivery. Whether or not local governments anticipate the revenue changes 
associated with nonattainment status, they do not maintain current public service 
expenditure levels when in nonattainment for ground-level ozone. 
 
Discussion and Policy Implications 
The fiscal impacts of ground-level ozone attainment status vary according to 
geography. Nonattainment status results in revenue decreases in population centers where 
compliance costs are concentrated. This is evident in the analysis of city revenues. 
Revenues in outlying areas increase in the presence of nonattainment status, and these 
increases diminish with distance from the urban core. There are two likely causes behind 
these observations. Nonattainment regulations are applied throughout the nonattainment 
area, but compliance costs are not expected to be concentrated in outlying areas because 
polluting activity is most concentrated in urbanized areas. While outlying areas 
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experience lower compliance costs, the regulatory benefits of cleaner air make outlying 
areas more desirable; the amenity of cleaner air would be capitalized in property values. 
Also, taxed industrial activity could migrate from urban centers with concentrated 
pollution to outlying areas. These increases in industrial activity in outlying areas would 
also lead to higher commercial or industrial property values.  
Even after attainment status has been gained, the fiscal effects of the 
nonattainment regulations persist in regulated areas. The lower revenues for cities and the 
higher revenues for counties after several years of nonattainment status persist after 
attainment status has been gained. Gaining attainment status does affect revenues in 
contiguous jurisdictions; the surrounding areas no longer have the same regulatory 
advantage. This results in small revenue decreases for contiguous cities and temporary 
property tax revenue decreases for contiguous counties. 
Finally, local governments address the revenue changes resulting from 
nonattainment status by altering current public service expenditure levels. Thus, the fiscal 
impacts of nonattainment status not only affect bureaucrats, but they also have tangible 
impacts on residents via changes in local public service delivery. 
Understanding these fiscal impacts could encourage local officials in population 
centers to pursue Early Action Compacts, an alternative to nonattainment status offered 
by the EPA beginning in 2003. These Early Action Compacts permit localities that will 
likely face nonattainment status to implement their own regulations to improve air quality 
instead of following the SIP requirements. Under an Early Action Compact, local 
officials have greater flexible in designing pollution regulations; this flexibility could be 
used to mitigate negative tax revenue impacts in urban centers. Future research could 
compare the fiscal effects of Early Action Compacts to the effects of nonattainment status. 
This would shed light on whether the fiscal effects of nonattainment status are unique to 
the EPA requirements for SIPs. 
Because nonattainment regulations are implemented at the state level, public 
officials in central cities that are in nonattainment may argue for special grants from the 
state government to compensate for revenue losses. Should state governments create 
grant programs for central cities in nonattainment areas because revenue reductions result 
in reduced spending on public services? Should outlying jurisdictions that surround 
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nonattainment areas be required to share a portion of their tax revenues? In light of the 
persistence of the fiscal effects of nonattainment status, how long should any revenue 
sharing or grant policies last? Or because city tax revenues in nonattainment areas appear 
to be the result of unhealthy levels of polluting activity, are such transfers unfounded 
because they ignore the health benefits of cleaner air? The results of this analysis provide 
an empirical framework for future research into these issues. 
If cities in nonattainment areas do not receive additional funds from the state or 
from other jurisdictions, they still have other options at their disposal to mitigate the 
negative revenue effects of nonattainment status. Cities can use tax incentives aimed at 
encouraging industries to invest in pollution abatement technology instead of relocating. 
Tax incentives would be effective for mitigating local tax revenue losses if a relatively 
small incentive would prevent a firm from relocating. Also, while cities in nonattainment 
areas are at a regulatory disadvantage compared with outlying areas, they have the 
potential of other advantages, such as infrastructure. Similar to tax incentives, local 
investments in public infrastructure could encourage firms to invest in pollution 
abatement instead of relocating production activities. Finally, instead of seeking direct 
intergovernmental transfers from the state, cities in nonattainment areas could attempt to 
persuade the state to offer tax incentives or to fund infrastructure investments aimed at 
mitigating local tax revenue losses.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Copyright © Douglas A. Carr 2007
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Chapter 5 
Conclusion 
 
Dissertation Summary 
The analysis in this dissertation tells a story of inter-jurisdictional environmental 
policy impacts. National environmental policy that causes capital migration is a tool for 
inter-jurisdictional competition, providing a political motivation for a national 
environmental policy. Also, the Clean Air Act is empirically shown to alter regional 
industrial geographies and the fiscal situations of local governments. 
Some environmental policies, such as ground-level ozone regulations under the 
Clean Air Act, are centralized regulations addressing primarily local issues. Inter-
jurisdictional competition offers one explanation for why national policies regulating 
local issues exist. A national environmental policy will affect national returns to capital, 
causing capital migration and altering local wage rates throughout the economy. These 
changes may benefit capital importing jurisdictions while harming capital exporting 
jurisdictions. These effects provide a motivation to influence national environmental 
policy. Thus, a national environmental policy may be used as a tool for inter-
jurisdictional competition. This model extends the current literature by providing a 
political motivation for supporting a national environmental policy that appears to have 
strictly local policy targets. 
The outcomes of national environmental policy are empirically examined via the 
Clean Air Act. The net local economic impacts of ozone nonattainment status are best 
understood using aggregate economic indicators. Nonattainment status is seen to reduce 
net economic activity both in nonattainment counties and in the surrounding counties. 
Furthermore, the reductions in surrounding counties are similar in magnitude to those in 
nonattainment counties. The net economic impacts of the Clean Air Act extend beyond 
nonattainment area boundaries, indicating the significance of regional economic linkages. 
Manufacturing sector activity declines in nonattainment counties and increases in cities 
contiguous to nonattainment areas. This suggests that manufacturing activity does 
migrate from nonattainment counties into surrounding population centers. 
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Ozone nonattainment status also impacts the fiscal realities of local governments. 
Revenues are initially reduced in nonattainment counties, and nonattainment cities 
experience sustained revenue reductions. Greater sustained revenue declines in cities than 
counties indicate that revenue collection increases in unincorporated nonattainment areas. 
Also, revenues show a small increase over time in surrounding counties. Thus, while 
nonattainment status reduces revenues collected in regulated population centers, 
surrounding areas experience fiscal benefits over time. These benefits appear to reduce 
with distance from regulated population centers. 
These findings extend the existing empirical literature by analyzing the regional 
impacts of ozone regulations under the Clean Air Act. By focusing on both nonattainment 
areas and contiguous counties, the inter-jurisdictional regulatory impacts can be 
understood. The existence of significant findings in jurisdictions surrounding 
nonattainment areas indicates the importance of not excluding such areas from 
environmental regulatory impact studies even when the environmental regulation appears 
to be strictly local in its implementation. 
Analysis of the aggregate economic effects is a departure from the existing 
literature, which primarily focuses on polluting industries. By analyzing regulatory 
impacts on aggregate economic indicators, I am able to assess the overall local and 
regional economic impacts of nonattainment regulations. This analysis captures 
production changes as firms may shift operations toward production in nonpolluting 
industries, as well as capturing reductions in nonpolluting industries that have significant 
ties to regulated polluting industries. While analysis of polluting industries highlights the 
direct regulatory impacts on targeted industries, this analysis of aggregate economic 
indicators reveals the overall regulatory impacts on local economies. 
This dissertation reveals inter-jurisdictional impacts not only through its regional 
approach, but also by analyzing the intergovernmental fiscal effects of ozone attainment 
status. Federal air quality regulations are found to indirectly impact the revenues and 
expenditures of local governments as local tax bases are altered. Also, these effects are 
not only observed in nonattainment areas. Federal ozone regulations applied to individual 
jurisdictions appear to have positive fiscal impacts in surrounding jurisdictions.  
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This research also extends the current literature by taking a more dynamic 
approach to analyzing policy impacts. Policy impacts change as firm investment and 
relocation decisions are affected over time in nonattainment areas. Furthermore, the 
removal of nonattainment regulations should not be expected to immediately and 
completely reverse nonattainment policy impacts. Understanding the ways in which 
impacts persist after attainment status has been gained paints a more complete picture of 
ozone regulatory effects. 
The empirical analysis in Chapters 3 and 4 shows that economic and fiscal 
impacts experienced during nonattainment largely persist after attainment status has been 
gained. Specifically, the overall economic declines experienced during nonattainment 
partially persist after attainment status has been gained. Also, compared with the 
expected total revenues after a decade of nonattainment, revenues are relatively 
unchanged when cities and counties gain attainment. 
In summary, this research extends the existing literature in several directions. The 
regional approach, dynamic emphasis, and inter-jurisdictional focus provide a broader 
understanding of ozone nonattainment regulatory impacts. This research also provides a 
political motivation for the formation of national environmental regulations. The 
remainder of this discussion focuses on the implications of these findings. 
 
Reflecting on Regional Impacts 
Ozone nonattainment regulations are seen to have economic impacts not only in 
nonattainment areas but also in surrounding areas. Both manufacturing sector and total 
economic activity is reduced in nonattainment areas. Total economic activity is also 
reduced in counties contiguous to nonattainment areas, although the reductions are 
smaller than they are in nonattainment areas. This suggests that regional economic 
linkages cause nonattainment regulations to have regional impacts that extend beyond the 
borders of nonattainment areas. The current literature focuses on nonattainment counties 
when assessing the impacts of nonattainment regulations. The exclusion of surrounding 
areas results in underestimates of regional and national impacts. 
Nonattainment regulations impact both the regional economy and the fiscal 
realities of local governments. Much can be learned by comparing these regulatory 
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effects. Cities and counties in nonattainment areas experience initial declines in total 
revenue. These initial reductions are likely the result of reduced economic activity in 
nonattainment areas. Total revenues for nonattainment cities remain depressed as the city 
continues in nonattainment status, while revenues recover in nonattainment counties. This 
could be explained by differing industrial impacts in cities and unincorporated areas. 
While net county economic activity decreases in nonattainment areas, this could be 
driven by decreases in cities. Economic activity migrating into the surrounding 
unincorporated areas would explain why city revenues remain depressed while county 
revenues recover. Economic recovery may be more difficult in cities where regulatory 
costs are likely concentrated. 
Manufacturing activity increases in cities that are contiguous to nonattainment 
areas. This observation supports the hypothesis that polluting activity relocates to 
surrounding areas, driving the positive fiscal impacts in the region surrounding regulated 
urban areas. However, declines in total economic activity are seen in counties contiguous 
to nonattainment areas. This suggests that manufacturing activity is more closely tied to 
local revenues than is other economic activity. Thus, while total economic activity 
declines in regions containing nonattainment areas, the fiscal effects of nonattainment 
regulations diminish with distance from the regulated population centers. 
 
Policy Implications and Future Research 
This analysis has several implications for public policy. First, national 
environmental regulatory outcomes would likely be more efficient if horizontal 
competition did not occur. If policy impacts were limited to regulated jurisdictions, inter-
jurisdictional competition would not be a factor in the formation of national air quality 
regulations. Because regional economic linkages cause Clean Air Act regulatory impacts 
to spill over into neighboring jurisdictions, perhaps the best way to limit regulatory 
impacts outside nonattainment boundaries is to limit the economic impacts within 
nonattainment areas. Regulations governing state implementation plan, or SIP, approval 
require technology-based approaches to mitigating local pollution. Replacing these 
requirements with market-based approaches is expected to reduce the industrial impacts 
of nonattainment regulations (Krupnick and McConnell, 2000).  
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A policy experiment currently exists that could be used to empirically test the 
impacts of different ozone regulations. In 2003 the EPA offered localities that would 
likely face nonattainment for the new 8-hour ozone standard the opportunity to form an 
Early Action Compact, or EAC. Each EAC is charged with complying with the new 8-
hour air quality standard sooner than would be required by nonattainment regulations; as 
long as the EAC meets intermediate air quality goals, nonattainment status is deferred. 
An EAC is not subject to the same regulatory requirements that govern a SIP. As data 
become available in the coming years, it would be enlightening to analyze how replacing 
SIP regulations has altered the regional regulatory impacts. 
To the extent that horizontal competition is not removed from air quality 
regulations, jurisdictions could use focused local economic development efforts to 
improve their ability to compete. Given that aggregate economic activity declines in and 
around nonattainment areas, local economic development efforts could focus on 
replacing the locally declining polluting industries with other industries that are less 
affected by nonattainment regulations. Such economic development would be helpful not 
only in nonattainment areas, but also in the surrounding jurisdictions. Furthermore, 
because economic impacts partially persist after attainment status has been gained, local 
commitment to this type of economic development would be beneficial even after the 
gaining of attainment status. 
Finally, because federal regulations governing the implementation of state 
policies result in local revenue decreases for nonattainment cities, these cities may argue 
for intergovernmental grants to offset declining revenues. Even though revenue declines 
in these cities are permanent, persisting after attainment status has been gained, 
permanent annual grants from the state or federal government would likely be difficult to 
secure. Instead of compensating for reduced revenue, temporary intergovernmental grants 
could be used to spur local economic development. Improvements to local infrastructure 
or some public services could make a locality more attractive to business, helping 
mitigate nonattainment regulatory impacts. 
Future research should focus on reducing the horizontal competition related to 
environmental policies. Theoretical research could compare national policy outcomes 
resulting from the horizontal competition described in Chapter 2 with the outcomes of 
 87
 
different policy instruments. Also, the empirical impacts of altering air quality policy 
tools can be assessed by studying EAC impacts as data becomes available.  
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